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Introduction 
 
In this thesis I will make a critical assessment of the Kantian formal 
conception of the will in light of Schelling and Cohen. My research question is 
twofold: how to assess the Kantian concept of will, given its notorious 'formality'? 
And under which conditions could Schelling's and Cohen's conception of the will 
meet the (assumed) flaws of the Kantian notion of the will?   
How could we evaluate Kant’s concept of the will in terms of its ‘formality’? 
What is the strength of Kant’s concept of the will and what is its weakness? Kant 
has provided us with a theory of how every rational human being can be ethical. 
We universally derive our ethical obligation, Kant claims, from the pure form of 
reason. This form of reason, motivating our will to act well, keeps our will formal. 
How can we assess this formality? On the one hand, the form of reason ensures 
that the individual can autonomously will and correspond to the ethical laws of a 
rational subject. This is the strength of Kant’s formal ethics. On the other hand, 
the form of reason makes our will lifeless, because Kant eliminates everything 
material. According to Kant, the will ought not be motivated by emotional 
inclinations nor serve a material purpose. Kant is not concerned with the matter 
of the action or what is to result from it, but solely with the form and the principle 
from which it does itself follow (Kant, 1984, 61). 
Kant’s morality is based on the presupposition that there ought to be a 
purely formal disposition to do good. Is there also a practical and vital disposition 
to do good? In other words, what would make the will dynamic? Could Schelling 
and Cohen perhaps solve the issue raised here? The problem of the lifelessness 
of the will lies in its theoretical nature. The faculty of thinking and willing are 
united in Kant’s practical philosophy. In both Schelling and Cohen a new road is 
opened for a will that is not limited by reason. They both permit the power of the 
spirit a role as motivator of the will, rather than reason. They also allow a 
dynamic power that has a disposition towards this spirit of the will. Both 
philosophers have a concept that replaces Kant’s formal concept of disposition, 
namely the concepts of Yearning and tendency. These concepts are not a motive 
of thinking but purely a motive of willing. Under the condition of making the will 
independent of the faculty of thinking, Schelling and Cohen are able to meet the 
flaws of Kant’s notion of the will.  
  
In chapter one I will evaluate Kant’s formal concept of the will. I will 
analyze Kant’s concept of the autonomous will and the disposition to do good in 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785). I will compare Kant’s concept of 
the will to his ideas in Der Streit der Fakultäten (1798), in which Kant offers an 
informal concept of disposition, namely enthusiasm or affect. Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804) is considered to be one of the most important philosophers in the 
history of western philosophy. He reinvigorated the position of idealism in times 
that empirical philosophy invalidated the claim that knowledge had its source in 
ideas. In Kant’s famous Kritik der reinen Vernunft, he argued that our knowledge 
is grounded in synthetic a priori ideas – ideas that are independent of the natural 
world of appearances. The principles of his practical philosophy, which I evaluate 
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in the first chapter, are also grounded in rational thought. I will assess whether 
practical rational thought can be the ground of the good will. Practical reason 
grants the will its independence from the natural world of desires. The 
independence from the chaos of instincts remains important for the idealism of 
the will. It is the one condition for the will not to be a simple desire. In chapter 
one, I will analyze the principles of Kant’s formal will and work out my critique to 
the limitation of the will by practical reason. Two problems caused by the 
limitation of the will are central to my research, namely the lack of moving power 
and the problematic form of practical reason itself. 
In chapter two I will explain Schelling’s concept of the will, as worked out 
in Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit 
und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (1809), also called the 
Freiheitsschrift. In this chapter I will answer the questions, under what condition 
does Schelling’s concept of the will overcome the flaws of Kant’s formal notion of 
the will, and what makes Schelling’s will a dynamic will? Friedrich Wilhelm 
Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) is often perceived as the midpoint of the 
development of German Idealism from Kant to Hegel. However, his mystic 
philosophy from the Freiheitsschrift shows that Schelling takes a path into a 
whole other direction than the philosophy of Hegel. Schelling’s mystic thought 
discusses a spirit that is different from Hegel’s concept of spirit. Schelling 
discusses a spirit of love that ensures to the dynamism of the will. Schelling’s 
reformulation of freedom leads to the reformulation of the will. Instead of practical 
reason, the spirit becomes the new form of the will. 
In chapter three, I will analyze Cohen’s concept of the pure will in Ethik 
des reinen Willens (1904). Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) is considered to be the 
father of Neo-Kantianism. Cohen returns to the philosophy of Kant, but renews it. 
Kant’s knowledge was grounded in the synthetic a priori ideas of the empirical 
world. Cohen’s knowledge is not grounded in absolute ideas, but in hypothetical 
ideas that are formed without the data of the empirical world. Cohen claims in his 
practical philosophy that the will is pure, because of a pure affect that moves the 
will and an ideal that motivates it. I will inquire how Cohen materializes the will 
through the notion of affect, and will inquire whether the concept of the ideal 
overcomes the formalism of Kant’s practical reason. Again, I begin this chapter 
with the question: under what condition could Cohen meet the flaws of Kant’s 
concept of the formal will. I will clarify how Cohen’s ethical interpretation of truth 
changes our perspective on the will. Under this condition, Cohen is able to 
introduce a pure will that begins to move through an affect and keeps moving 
towards an ethical act. 
In chapter four, the final chapter, I will reassess the visions of Schelling 
and Cohen in relation to Kant’s formal will. Consequently, I will conclude on the 
ultimate being of a dynamic will. Schelling makes a division of two wills: a Wille 
der Grund and a Wille der Liebe. Cohen makes a subdivision of the will: a pure 
will is grounded in the motoric power of an affect and the motivation of self-
consciousness. Why can’t they conceive of one will with one ground that 
overcomes the formality of Kant? I will analyze the diverging ideas on the 
composition of a dynamic will and draw conclusions on the ultimate being of a 
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dynamic will. Consequently I come to the conclusion that it is the spirit (of love) 
that makes the will ultimately dynamic. In terms of this spirit we can overcome 
Kant’s formalism and conceive of a philosophy that deals with a creative, 
revelatory and redemptive character in human beings. 
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1 
 
The Formality of the Will 
 
 I. Evaluating Kant’s formal concept of the will 
 
How can we evaluate the formality of Kant’s concept of the will? In the 
introduction I suggested that there is both a negative and a positive side to Kant’s 
formal will. Kant believes that there is only a positive side to the formal will. What 
is this positive interpretation of the formal will? Kant conceives of the will as a will 
that is limited by the faculty of reason and its representations of moral law. The 
will is independent because of practical reason and the exclusion of lustful 
desires and other inclinations. The limitation of the will entails that the will cannot 
be motivated by any material inclination or goal, but by the principles of universal 
law alone. Kant values the independence of the will or our autonomy highest. Be 
that as it may, my natural reaction to limitation is negative. Kant also says that we 
cannot conceive of anything good as limited. Nevertheless, he makes an 
exception for the will (Kant, 1984, 28). Kant thinks it is good (or appropriate) that 
the will is limited. I think differently about the limitation of the will. I claim that it 
makes the will lifeless. A limited will may be good from Kant’s perspective, as it is 
independent of any external inclination. Yet, as I will show, a limited will turns out 
to be impractical, as it has no moving power and it is unsustainable in regard to 
changing social conditions.  
In this chapter, I will elaborate on Kant’s formal concept of the will in the 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. I will explain what, according to Kant, 
grounds the good will, or in other terms, what Kant believes to be the source of 
goodness. I will claim that Kant implicitly accepts that the formal will is lifeless in 
Der Streit der Fakultäten. He implicitly accepts this claim when he introduces the 
concept of Affekt. This concept solves the problem of the limitation of the will, but 
not sufficiently. Kant is unable to reformulate the form of the will and unable to 
incorporate the affect within a pure concept of the will. Chapters 2 and 3 address 
these issues.  
There have been many people before me that have taken issue with the 
formality of Kant’s concept of the will. The Phenomenologist and Neo-Kantian 
philosopher Max Scheler has critiqued in Formalismus in der Ethik und die 
materiele Wertethik (1913) Kant’s formal will for its exclusion of matter: emotional 
inclinations and material purposes. Kant is not concerned with the matter of the 
action or what is to result from the will, but solely with the form and the principle 
from which it does itself follow (Kant, 1984, 61) Scheler claims that a will needs 
emotional feeling of value (Wertgefühl). The concept of the will needs to include 
the concept of pathos. I will argue in this chapter that Kant’s formal will lacks an 
emotional affect to move the will into actual action. 
One way of challenging the formality of the will is to critique the lack of 
pathos; another way is to disagree with the form or principle of the will. There 
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have been many philosophers, like Hegel 1  and Nietzsche 2 , all the way to 
Horkheimer and Macintyre that have criticized Kant’s universalizing principles of 
the will. Kant’s will is guided by a categorical imperative, which is a principle that 
man develops by means of practical reason. If this principle is right, it is always 
right, and if it is wrong, it is always wrong. Horkheimer and Macintyre critique this 
form of reason of the enlightenment, because it cannot account for the social 
changes that take place throughout history. 3  Categorical imperatives are 
inflexible to social changes and differences. I will argue in this chapter that the 
inflexibility of categorical imperatives puts a check on the dynamism of the will.  
The static character of Kant’s will is, on the one hand, a result of the 
confinement of the will to the sphere of the morality of practical reason, and, on 
the other, a result of the period in which Kant lived: the Enlightenment. Kant was 
a typical representative of the Enlightenment. He believed in the power of reason 
and in the effectiveness of reforming institutions (Macintyre, 1968, 190). Kant 
believed that man could be a moral individual, independent of the existing social 
order. He sympathized with the French revolution, “hated servility and valued 
independence of mind. Paternalism, so he held, was the grossest form of 
despotism.” (Macintyre, 1968, 198) A core belief of the Enlightenment is that man 
has a free will, and therefore has the autonomy to be a moral agent. For Kant, 
man’s goodness does not lie in God, but in one’s individual will. Goodness is not 
to be found in any hypothetical end, like happiness, one’s altruistic nature or self-
interest, but in one’s will and the duty of the categorical imperative alone.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hegel is one of the first to critique Kant’s moral philosophy for its ‘empty 
formalism’. Hegel calls Kant’s categorical imperative (the good will) formal and 
empty because it is adopted for the sake of its universal form and not for the 
sake of the content that the law addresses (Hegel, 2009, 117-118). The formula 
of universal law (the law has to take into account the question ‘what if everybody 
did it?’) neglects the desires and interests that the maxim advances.  Hegel says, 
“So wesentlich es ist, die reine unbedingte Selbstbestimmung des Willens als die 
Wurzel der Pflicht herauszuheben, wie den die Erkenntniß des Willens erst durch 
die Kantische Philosophie ihren festen Grund und Ausgangspunkt durch den 
2  “Manch Anderer, vielleicht gerade auch Kant, giebt mit seiner Moral zu 
verstehn: ‘was an mir achtbar ist, das ist, dass ich gehorchen kann,  - und bei 
euch soll es nicht anders stehn, als bei mir!’” (Nietzsche, 1980, 107) Nietzsche 
critiques Kant’s morality for the universalizing principles, because man obeys a 
law that is external to him, as the law neglects historicity and the needs of the 
body.  
3 Horkheimer and Adorno critique enlightenment philosophy for the creation of a 
culture industry in which “every branch of culture is unanimous within itself and 
all are unanimous together.” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, 94) Macintyre, on the 
other hand, critiques Renaissance and Enlightenment (moral) philosophy for 
neglecting the history of the subject. He argues that moral concepts cannot be 
understood as “timeless, limited, unchanging, determinate species of concept, 
necessarily having the same features throughout their history.” (Macintyre, 1968, 
1) 
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II. Die Grundlegung: the ground of the good will  
 
Kant’s concept of the will in the Grundlegung is a moral concept. It is a 
concept that presupposes the existence of moral laws. Kant says that the will 
makes man a moral being, but only because the will makes moral laws. In the 
Grundlegung, Kant does not answer the question ‘what makes man a moral 
being?’, but he answers the question ‘why has man respect for the law?’, in 
which the question of ‘why man is moral’ is implied. Kant assumes that every 
thing in nature works according to laws (Kant, 1984, 56). A moral being 
consequently also works in conformity with laws. Therefore, Kant presupposes 
that morality is part of a system of laws. Kant does not justify this claim in the 
Grundlegung. For that reason I want to evaluate whether morality belongs to the 
formal world of laws. In other words, the lack of a justification demands an 
evaluation of the formality of the will.  
In the Grundlegung, Kant tries to find the ground of our respect for moral 
law. He explains that man respects the law, because he is rational. Practical 
reason is not a means of the will that makes the will good. Practical reason is the 
same as the good will. Thus, practical reason does not make the will a good will, 
because there is only one type of will for Kant, namely a good will. The ground of 
the good will is man’s autonomy or disposition to goodness. On that account, 
Kant concludes that man’s autonomy or disposition to goodness is the source of 
our moral behavior or the respect for moral law. Let’s say that man’s morality has 
three levels. The top floor is man’s respect for law. Under it is the first floor of 
practical reason by means of which we legislate. The first floor is not just the floor 
of practical reason, but also of the good will. As is said, Kant equals practical 
reason to the good will. The capacity to practically think is the same as the 
capacity to will. Practical reason or the good will constitutes the first floor. The 
first and second floors have their foundation in the ground floor of autonomy and 
disposition. The good will is grounded in autonomy. Practical reason is grounded 
in the disposition to goodness. I will later demonstrate why autonomy and 
disposition are the same thing and constitute the foundation of Kant’s building of 
morality.  
The formality of Kant’s concept of the will is based on the laws of morality. 
Kant’s moral idealism is Platonic, as the will represents an idea, form, or law. In 
the Grundlegung, Kant asks why man has respect for the law. The first section of 
the book gives an empirical explanation. Man respects moral law because he is 
rational. Kant’s moral idealism is grounded in the Aristotelian idea that man is a 
rational animal, taken by Kant to be empirically true. A rational being “hat das 
Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung der Gesetze, d.i. nach Prinzipien, zu handeln, 
oder einen Willen.” (Kant, 1984, 56) A rational being has the capacity to act 
according to principles or to the will. For Kant, the will is nothing other than 
practical reason (Kant, 1984, 56). “Der Wille ist ein Vermögen, nur dasjenige zu 
wählen, was die Vernunft unabhängig von der Neigung als praktisch notwendig, 
d.i. als gut, erkennt” (Kant, 1984, 56) The will is a rational choice for that what is 
practically necessary, that is, what is  cognized to be good. Our practical reason 
that represents the universal moral law is Kant’s concept of the will. The moral 
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law, which is represented by practical reason, is the reason why Kant’s will is a 
formal will.  
What kind of reason makes us moral beings? Kant says that practical 
reason makes us moral beings. Kant discerns practical reason from theoretical 
reason. The first is directed towards the good (principle of ethics), while the latter 
is directed towards the right (principle of logic). The ground of practical reason is 
the goodness of the will. Kant, therefore, argues in the second section of the 
Grundlegung that people with practical reason have a good will. Man respects 
the law because he has a will that is directed towards the good. How does the 
will make us moral? The will is able to make us moral because of its 
independency. “Der Wille wird als ein Vermögen gedacht, der Vorstellung 
gewisser Gesetze gemäß, sich selbst zum Handeln zu bestimmen.” (Kant, 1984, 
77) The will can determine itself to action, because it is motivated by a 
categorical imperative that tells us what we ought to do, irrespective of any 
(im)personal inclination. The categorical imperative of practical reason makes the 
will an end in itself, and not a means to an end. This means that by willing 
goodness, that is, by the practical idea of goodness alone, we are respecting the 
moral law.  
What does Kant mean with willing goodness? First of all, the will and 
goodness are inseparable in Kant’s philosophy. Goodness is the being of the will. 
“Der Wille ist slechterdings gut, der nicht böse sein, mithin dessen Maxime, wenn 
sie zu einem allgemeinem Gesetze gemacht wird, sich selbst niemals 
widerstreiten kann” (Kant, 90) The will is always a good will when it is pure, when 
practical reason is absolute and not contaminated by other interests (Kant, 1984, 
124-25). An impure will does not exist in Kant’s dictionary. The will as ‘Vermögen’ 
would become another kind of capacity when it is not motivated by practical 
reason, e.g. a desire or inclination. Therefore, the will is grounded in the practical 
idea of goodness.  
What does Kant mean with goodness? “Das Wesentlich-Gute besteht in 
der Gesinnung.” (Kant, 1984, 61) The ground of our goodness, or good will, is 
the disposition to goodness. The disposition to goodness is “was die Vernunft 
unabhängig von der Neigung als praktisch notwendig erkennt” (Kant, 1984, 56) 
The disposition to goodness is a state of mind. It indicates that man has a 
capacity to be independent from other natural inclinations. However, Kant does 
not specify what kind of capacity it is. He rather describes the disposition to 
goodness as that what makes our practical reason or our will an end in itself. The 
disposition to goodness is the independency of the will, as it is not concerned 
with the result of the will, either good or bad, but it is concerned with that what 
motivates the will. The disposition makes the will good by itself. The effects of the 
will cannot be a condition for the goodness of the will.  
Kant speaks of the effects of the will, and separates them from the 
disposition of the will. The being of this will consists not in the effects that arise 
out of the will, but consists in the disposition. The disposition is the maxim of the 
will, and reveals itself in its action, that is, in the act of legislating (Kant, 1984, 
88). Willing goodness means that man legislates his own law. This entails that 
man respects no other law than the law he at the same time gives himself. In 
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creating one’s own law, man reveals his disposition to goodness. Man does not 
create law for another purpose than for the dignity of creating the law by himself. 
All ‘Würde’ [dignity] of making law, that is, goodness, lies in the fact that we obey 
our own law and not the law of someone else. The ground of goodness is not just 
our disposition, but also our autonomy (Kant, 1984, 89).  
How do disposition and autonomy relate to one another? Autonomy 
means that man makes his own law. Yet, it also implies that man obeys his own 
law, and not the law of someone else. Kant talks more specifically about the 
autonomy of the will and not about the autonomy of man. The “Autonomie des 
Willens ist die Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch derselbe ihm selbst 
(unabhängig von aller Beschaffenheit der Gegenstände des Wollens) ein Gesetz 
ist.” (Kant, 1984, 95) This ‘Beschaffenheit’ or quality of the will is the disposition 
to goodness. Disposition means that our practical reason is independent of any 
other inclination. The disposition of the will and the autonomy of the will are 
therefore one and the same quality of the will.  
When autonomy and ‘Gesinnung’ are one and the same thing, it means 
that the disposition is formal. Kant talks about the disposition as a state of mind. 
Yet, it is not a state of mind, which we can understand in psychological terms. 
The disposition is a form or principle that is derived from moral law. The state of 
mind that makes us moral is completely fixed and static. It cannot move, as it is 
unrelated to the ‘Materie der Handlung’ (Kant, 1984, 61) Kant disconnects the will 
from the act. This disconnection makes the will lifeless, I think, because there is 
no more feeling (both internal and external) for the will to act. Kant does not 
explain to us how the will moves, because it could compromise the 
independence of the will. For him, the will has to be completely disinterested. 
Disinterestedness entails two things. On the one hand, it entails that the will is 
universal by means of the maxims of law. On the other hand, it means that the 
will blocks intervening inclinations. Kant claims that disinterestedness, the formal 
disposition of man, is the precondition for morality.  
A good will that does not result in an act and has no pathological influence 
of inclination is in my view a lifeless will. As an enlightenment thinker, Kant 
disconnects the will from nature. I would take it further and claim that Kant 
disconnects the will from life – spiritual life.4 My assessment of Kant’s concept of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Tom Sorell claims in his analysis of Kant’s concept of the good will that man’s 
good will is also man’s good nature. Yet, I have just argued that the good will 
excludes everything in nature, even our altruistic and other virtuous sorts of 
behavior that are not grounded in duty. Our good will is always a result of the 
duty alone. A man is not naturally virtuous, but only by abiding by his moral laws. 
There is nothing else that moves an ethical person than duty, that is, a 
categorical imperative. Nonetheless, Sorell argues that a duty can go together 
with other inclinations, like juridical ones. For instance, the moral law not to steal 
from someone can go together with the self-interested idea that the punishment 
after stealing makes it futile to steal  (Sorell, 84). Similarly, Sorell claims that our 
good will, which is guided by duty, can go together with our virtuous nature. Our 
virtuous natural inclinations are, however, never a motive of the good will. The 
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the will is that the limitation of the will is negative. On the one hand, the limitation 
of the will excludes the matter of the action or what is to result from the will. On 
the other hand, the limitation of the will to the form of practical reason is 
exclusive. Practical reason limits our spiritual and dynamic relation to the world to 
the categorical imperative.   
 
III. Der Streit der Fakultäten: enthusiasm as informal disposition 
 
In Der Streit der fakultäten, there is no actual concept of the will, except 
for the notion of enthusiasm. I believe that the notion of enthusiasm is of help to 
the problem of the limitation of the will. In a way, Kant shows the shortcomings of 
his own moral thought in the second section, which is called ‘Der Streit der 
philosophische Fakultät mit der juristischen’. The faculty of philosophy is to grant 
independence to the juridical in times of oppression. That’s why Kant wants to 
demonstrate from a philosophically historic point of view that there is always 
enthusiasm for moral progress, even when the legislative and judiciary powers 
have lost their independence. In contrast to the Grundlegung, Kant does not 
discuss morality in the strict moral terms of law, but rather in the historic terms of 
progress. While the Grundlegung offers a strictly moral concept of the will, here 
Kant offers a possible historic concept of the will. The notion of enthusiasm 
shows that our moral capacity needs an affect. 
Kant’s main idea in Der Streit der Fakultäten, that an affect, rather than 
reason, drives our moral capacity and urge to moral progress, has awakened 
new interest in many modern philosophers. The postmodern philosopher Lyotard 
wrote a whole book about the affect enthusiasm called L’enthousiasme; La 
critique kantienne de l’histoire (1986). Lyotard is concerned with the perception of 
history, whose ‘reality’ is not conceived in terms of reason, like Hegel does, but in 
terms of the unreasonable. Lyotard, who wrote a lot about the esthetic feeling of 
the sublime, is also interested in enthusiasm as a phenomenon of the transition 
from nature to freedom. Enthusiasm is, on the one hand, a natural (pathological) 
affect, and is, on the other hand, directed towards moral progress, that is, 
freedom. The transition from nature to freedom is, according to Lyotard, an effect 
of the sublime (Lyotard, 21). Lyotard puts the notion of enthusiasm within a 
critique of history that belongs to a political and esthetic discourse. Lyotard does 
not look at the notion of enthusiasm in relation to the will and Kant’s practical 
philosophy. My goal is to inquire the phenomenon of enthusiasm, as discussed 
by Kant in Streit der Fakultäten, and evaluate whether it could solve the problems 
inherent to Kant’s practical thought.  
In Der Streit der Fakultäten Kant talks about the phenomenon of 
enthusiasm for goodness, which he observed in the behavior of French 
revolutionaries. Their universal and disinterested enthusiasm for goodness 
appears to be a mystery in relation to the formal will. How can it be that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
good will remains grounded in a formal disposition. The good will remains 
lifeless, even though there are lively virtues that accompany the good will. 
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something irrational like enthusiasm causes man to be moral? In Der Streit der 
Fakultäten Kant raises the question, ‘is the human race continually improving?’ 
He is, in this work, not looking at the improvement caused by law, but at 
improvement as a general phenomenon throughout history. In Der Streit der 
Fakultäten, Kant explains that there two ways of looking at history. First of all, we 
could look at history as determined and constant. Consequently, things are 
eternal and unchanging, just like the Platonic laws are. Our moral behavior would 
accordingly continually deteriorate, improve, or eternally stand still. Yet, “unter 
euch ist nichts beständig als die Unbeständigkeit!” (Kant, 1916, 395) Kant quotes 
abbot Coyer, “nothing in history is constant among us but inconstancy.” Is 
continual progress therefore an illusion? According to Kant, one can dictate freely 
acting beings what they ought to do, as we have seen in the Grundlegung, but 
one cannot predict what they actually will do (Kant, 1916, 395). Kant shows the 
weakness of his concept of the formal will here implicitly. He says that we can 
have a moral law, but still do evil. Kant therefore suggests another way of looking 
at history. He proposes that we look at an undetermined history, one without 
laws, in order to assess whether man is continually progressing. 
In Der Streit der Fakultäten, Kant is dealing with the will of an 
undetermined history, a history without laws. In this history, there are signs and 
not actual occasions that prove man’s moral progress. Kant does not concentrate 
on the deeds of man that caused moral depravation or purification, but he 
concentrates on a certain attitude in man. Kant focuses on a certain disposition in 
man, rather than on man’s actual behavior. He is concerned with a historical sign 
that indicates human progress, rather than a specific historical moment. Not the 
French Revolution itself, but the attitude of French revolutionaries prove man’s 
moral progress. 
Kant explains that the problem of progress cannot be solved directly from 
experience. It is our own free moral action that determines the progress of the 
future (Kant, 1916, 396). Yet, there must be some experience of a historical 
event that shows a tendency towards free moral action. There must be a 
historical sign that prophesizes the constant progress the human race makes. 
The attitude of French revolutionaries and their supporters is Kant’s historical 
sign. Kant says,  
 
“es ist bloß die Denkungsart der Zuschauer, welche sich bei diesem 
Spiele großer Umwandlungen öffentlich verrät und eine so allgemeine 
und doch uneigennützige Teilnehmung der Spielenden auf einer Seite 
gegen die auf der andern, selbst mit Gefahr, die Parteilichkeit könne 
ihnen sehr nachteilig werden, dennoch laut werden läßt, so aber (der 
Allgemeinheit wegen) einen Character des Menschengeschlechts im 
Ganzen und zugleich (der Uneigennützigkeit wegen) einen moralischen 
Charakter desselben wenigstens in der Anlage beweiset, der das 
Fortschreiten zum Besseren nicht allein hoffen läßt, sondern selbst 
schon ein solches ist, so weit das Vermögen desselben für jetzt 
zureicht.” (Kant, 1916, 397-98)  
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The state of mind [‘Denkungsart’] of the French revolutionaries is one of 
disinterested and universal enthusiasm for moral goodness. I call enthusiasm an 
informal disposition to goodness, as it is disinterested, universal, and an affect 
that wills the moral. Despite its informality, “daß wahrer Enthusiasm geht nur 
immer aufs Idealische und zwar rein Moralische, dergleichen der Rechtsbegriff 
ist, und nicht auf den Eigennutz gepfropft warden kann. (Kant, 1916, 399). The 
‘Affekt’ is the life-based, informal disposition that makes man moral. Kant does 
not say that the ‘Affekt’ moves the will, as he is solely speaking about the ‘Affekt’ 
itself. Nevertheless, he demonstrates here a lively element that apart from the 
will makes man a moral being. He puts forward a solution for the lifelessness of 
the formal will. Yet, he does not put the notion of affect or enthusiasm within the 
concept of the will. Kant merely suggests that enthusiasm is directed at the 
moral. In respect to his practical philosophy, this would mean that enthusiasm 
directs us to the freedom of the will.   
How does enthusiasm relate to autonomy and the disposition to goodness? 
The concepts of autonomy and disposition are the same in the Grundlegung. In 
Der Streit der Fakultäten, they are very different, because there has come into 
being another concept of disposition.  I have earlier called the disposition 
disinterested and universal in character. Enthusiasm, as Kant discusses it, is also 
disinterested and universal. On the one hand, enthusiasm is directed to the moral 
and is never self-interested. Thus, enthusiasm is disinterested. Furthermore, 
Kant believes enthusiasm to be a universal phenomenon, observable for 
instance in the behavior of the French revolutionaries.  
Enthusiasm is a disposition, but an informal one, because it is irrational. 
Therefore, we cannot equate enthusiasm to autonomy. Enthusiasm is not the 
intellectual motivation of the will, but it is an affect. Enthusiasm reveals itself in 
the activity of the French revolutionaries, and not in the process of legislating. 
Kant‘s concept of enthusiasm as affect has to be distinguished from the 
intellectual motivation of practical reason. Enthusiasm is different from autonomy 
because it is different from practical reason. Enthusiasm is the affect and not the 
will that legislates. Enthusiasm is not the source of law, but the source of human 
progress and man’s moral character. Kant does not yet seem to understand the 
consequences of the introduction of enthusiasm within his moral philosophy. He 
says that enthusiasm is idealistic and directed at a concept of right, but he cannot 
yet relate it to our autonomy and power to legislate. Kant cannot relate 
enthusiasm to freedom in his own system of thought.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I wanted to evaluate Kant’s formal concept of the will. I have 
largely focused on the lifelessness of the formal will. The lifelessness is a result 
of the limitation of the will by practical reason. This limitation takes with itself the 
lack of matter and the danger of its form. On the one hand, the will, as described 
in the Grundlegung has no affect that moves it into action. On the other hand, the 
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will is limited by practical reason, of which the categorical imperatives are 
inflexible and possibly clash with changing social conditions.  
Let’s repeat to what conclusions I have come in this chapter. Kant’s 
Grundlegung serves as an example for formal ethics. Kant tells us that the will is 
motivated by practical reason, which represents moral law. The moral law 
represented by practical reason makes the will a formal will. The formality of the 
will is grounded in man’s capacity to create his own law, independent of any 
inclination and the effect of the will. The formality of the will is grounded in man’s 
‘Gesinnung’. In legislating we can notice the structure of the ‘Gesinnung’: firstly, 
in legislating we are not concerned with the effect of the will, and, secondly, in 
legislating the will is purely rational by making representations or maxims of law. 
The ‘Gesinnung’ does not represent a real capacity that moves the will, but is a 
notion used to describe a ‘Beschaffenheit’ or quality of the will. The will lacks 
moving power, because the disposition excludes every form of feeling that 
belongs to the will. Furthermore, practical reason makes the will inflexible. 
Therefore, I argue that the will, according to Kant’s conception, is lifeless.  
In Der Streit der Fakultäten, Kant describes a capacity that desires 
goodness. Kant counts it as a condition for moral improvement and calls it 
enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is a ‘Gesinnung’, as it is universal and disinterested, but 
an informal one, as it does not motivate us to legislate. This brings our inquiry 
outside the perspective of law. The phenomenon of enthusiasm among the 
French revolutionaries shows us that man makes moral progress without the rule 
of law. In Der Streit der Fakultäten, Kant is for once interested in what makes 
man moral regardless of law. He says that we can dictate man to be moral, but 
we cannot predict what he will actually do. Kant shows the weakness of his 
concept of the formal will here. He implicitly says that we can have a moral law, 
but still do evil. It is therefore not our capacity to independently legislate (our 
autonomy), but our enthusiasm that makes us moral beings. The presupposition 
in the Grundlegung that everything works according to laws is therefore 
unfounded, which disqualifies the formality of the will.  
  Shortly it seemed that Kant solved his own problem. Enthusiasm may 
count as the force that makes us moral beings. Enthusiasm is directed towards 
the moral and excludes any self-interest. It is the power that the formal will needs 
to move. Why do I still need to look at Schelling and Cohen in the following 
chapters? Why is Kant’s notion of enthusiasm insufficient to the vitalization of the 
concept of the will? When we throw the notion of enthusiasm into Kant’s practical 
philosophy of the Grundlegung, we find out that it is incommensurable to the form 
of the good will, which excludes every form of hypothetical power like 
enthusiasm. As a result we deal with two problems. Firstly, we do not yet have a 
concise idea of the problem of the form of Kant’s will. We do not know how to 
think of a formless will or a newly formed will that is other than practical reason. 
Secondly, we do not yet understand how to incorporate the affect within a pure 
concept of the will. Schelling and Cohen help us with both. Schelling helps us to 
critique the transcendental form of the good will and introduces a twofold 
solution. Cohen helps us to incorporate the affect within the concept of a pure 
will. Schelling and Cohen materialize and vitalize Kant’s formal concept of the 
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will, which is empty of material power and action, and is infected by the 
inflexibility of practical reason. In the second and third chapter, I will elucidate the 
critique Schelling and Cohen would give to Kant’s concept of the will. 
Furthermore, I will tell how they address the problems of matter and form of the 
will.  
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2 
 
Schelling’s Concept of the Will 
 
I. Reinventing Idealism 
 
In this chapter we arrive at the core of my research, where we start to find 
solutions for the flaws of Kant’s concept of the will. In this and the following 
chapter we begin to find out what a lively or vital will philosophically has to look 
like. In this chapter I will answer the question: under what condition could 
Schelling’s concept of the will meet the flaws of the Kantian notion of will?  
Before I will answer that question, we have to pin down the flaws of Kant’s 
moral philosophy and explain how Schelling can tackle these problems. Also, we 
have to be aware that I use a text by Schelling, the Freiheitsschrift, in which 
Schelling defends a concept of freedom that is completely different from Kant’s 
concept of autonomy. As a result there comes into being a new concept of the 
will, which I believe to be a concept that has overcome Kant’s formality. To clarify 
why Schelling’s concept of the will should replace the one by Kant, I have to 
elaborate on the flaws of Kant’s concept and the possible critique Schelling gave 
to it. I want to avoid any incommensurability between Schelling’s concept and 
that of Kant. Therefore I will focus in this chapter on one of the two elements of 
Kant’s will that have to be fixed, namely the form of the will. I will address the 
element of the matter of the will, which Kant’s concept of the will is lacking, in 
chapter 3.  
The difference between Schelling and Kant is maybe best symbolized by 
the idea of an end of idealism, which Dale Snow proclaims in his book Schelling 
and the End of Idealism. I want to emphasize his claim in order to distance 
Schelling from Kant and to stress the point that Schelling’s concept of the will 
overcomes the one by Kant. Schelling’s critique of Kant’s Enlightenment thought, 
or the Enlightenment view of reason is fruitful, but Schelling’s own view of reason 
remains unclear sometimes, says Snow (Snow, 1996, 143). I must agree that 
Schelling’s approach to Kant’s practical reason is sometimes vague. On the one 
hand, he fully supports practical reason by asserting, “no system can be 
completed other than practically” (Snow, 1946, 31). On the other hand, he rejects 
it completely. I believe that Schelling rejects Kant’s formal approach to practical 
reason in the Freiheitsschrift. Nevertheless, he animates practical reason by 
means of the power of the spirit.5 Schelling’s mystical approach to practical 
understanding is, I believe, of huge importance for the reformulation of the will. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Schelling says, “Denn so hoch wir auch die Vernunft stellen, glauben wir doch 
z.B. nicht, daß jemand aus reiner Vernunft tugendhaft, oder ein Held, oder 
überhaupt ein großer Mensch sei; ja nicht einmal, nach der bekannten Rede, daß 
das Menschengeschlecht durch sie fortgepflanzt werde. Nur in der Persönlichkeit 
is Leben; und alle Persönlichkeit ruht auf einem dunkeln Grunde, der also 
allerdings auch Grund der Erkenntnis sein muß.” (Schelling, 2011, 85) Here 
Schelling rejects formal reason and claims the mystical ground of understanding.  
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The reformulation of the concept of freedom is the beginning of the approach to 
practical reason. The dialectic between freedom and the system of reason 
exemplifies the troublesome relation to practical reason. I want to make clear that 
Schelling aborts the dialectic in the Freiheitsschrift when he reunites freedom, not 
with the system of practical reason, but with something that is alive, becoming, 
and has a will. The unification of freedom with the will, rather than with reason, 
marks the end of Kantian idealism, and the beginning of a new and informal one.  
 
II. Deformalizing the will 
 
In contrast to Kant’s moral concept of the will, Schelling has a naturalistic 
(human) and mystic one. This can be seen in his division of Wille der Grund (will 
of the ground) and Wille der Liebe (will of love). The will of love is man’s mystical 
will, and the will of the ground man’s natural. Schelling’s goal in the 
Freiheitsschrift is to align nature to freedom. Kant already found a way to link 
nature with freedom in Streit der Fakultäten by means of the notion of 
enthusiasm. Schelling knows to link both by reformulating freedom. The 
reformulation of freedom is important for the reformulation of the will, as freedom 
is the being of the will.  
Kant’s concept of freedom is a formal or transcendental one. Kant uses a 
concept of autonomy, through which our will wills goodness alone. Kant’s will is 
limited to goodness. On the contrary, Schelling conceives of a will that has the 
freedom to will evil also. For Schelling, freedom entails that there can be no limit 
at all, not even the limitation of the will by practical reason. Schelling has a 
concept of freedom that represents the nasty reality of nature: man has a 
capacity to will both good and evil. Snow says, “In of Human Freedom, the 
acknowledgment of the reality of evil presents the most radical challenge 
conceivable to systematic philosophy. Schelling’s handling of that challenge is 
what sets him apart from every other thinker of this time.” (Snow, 1996, 146) The 
crux of this chapter is thus: Schelling attacks the transcendental form of Kant’s 
will and replaces it firstly with a naturalistic (human) form: man has a will of the 
ground that is able to will both goodness and evil. He secondly replaces it with a 
mystic form, which I will explain later. 
Let’s discuss Schelling’s concept of freedom shortly and the concomitant 
critique of Kant’s formal concept of the will. Let’s start with saying that Schelling’s 
Freiheitsschrift is an assessment of freedom foremost and only secondarily an 
assessment of the will. Schelling offers a critique of formality in the 
Freiheitsschrift, which is a critique of the formal concept of freedom. This critique 
is directed towards the ‘dogmatism’ of Spinoza’s pantheism, which makes an 
attempt to find the unconditional in the absolute. Only hastily does Schelling 
mention and critique Kant’s concept of the will. Schelling says that Kant’s 
idealism of the will allows freedom a role in Spinoza’s pantheism, but fails to give 
the will an exact and decisive role in idealism. Let me explain Schelling’s problem 
with Spinoza first and his problem with Kant second. 
Schelling finds Spinoza’s pantheism dogmatic, because it does not do 
justice to the first cause of the rational system of efficient causes. Spinoza does 
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not allow a first cause in an infinite system of efficient causes. There is no place 
for a God to have the freedom to create and to be the first cause. The idealism of 
Kant, on the other hand, provides scope for freedom in Spinoza’s pantheism 
through a concept of the will. Schelling says, “Wollen ist Ursein, und auf diesen 
allein passen alle Prädikate desselben: Grundlosigkeit, Ewigkeit, Unabhängigkeit 
von der Zeit, Selbstbejahung.” (Schelling, 2011, 23) Schelling conceives of 
Kant’s will as the primal being, the first cause in a pantheistic system. 
Nonetheless, Schelling declares Kant’s formal concept of freedom as useless: it 
leaves us helpless in the doctrine of freedom (Schelling, 2011, 23). Kant’s 
negative concept of freedom as a thing-in-itself, independent from time, does not 
fit in the world of things or appearances. Schelling argues, in the footsteps of 
Fichte, that we are required to show “daß alles Wirkliche (die Natur, die Welt der 
Dinge) Tätigkeit, Leben und Freiheit zum Grund habe.” (Schelling, 2011, 24) 
Why is Kant’s concept of the will not showing that everything real (in the 
world of things) has activity, life and freedom as its ground? Kant’s concept of the 
will only belongs to the practically thinking being and not to the natural world. It is 
precisely Schelling’s purpose to show that man belongs to the natural world. 
Kant’s concept of things-in-themselves, e.g. freedom, should not only belong to 
the transcendental world, but also to things in general (Schelling, 2011, 24). This 
does not mean that a thing, like a stone, has freedom, but it means that man as a 
natural being and not as a transcendental being has freedom. Man as a natural 
being is different from things of the transcendental world. Therefore, Schelling 
makes a difference between the freedom of man and the freedom of God. This 
entails that there is a difference between the will of man and the will of a 
transcendental world. While the transcendental will can will goodness alone, the 
will of man can will both goodness and evil. Man’s freedom is his capacity for 
good and evil (Schelling, 2011, 25). This is Schelling’s ‘vital’ concept of freedom.  
How can the will will evil? This is an essential question, as Kant explained 
that the will can only will goodness. Kant claimed that the will is necessarily 
rational, and practical reason is always directed at goodness. According to Kant, 
evil could only be a result of lustful behavior, but never an effect of a rational will. 
Schelling, on the contrary, argues that the will is not necessarily rational. The will 
has also an evil capacity. At this point, Schelling de-formalizes Kant’s formal will. 
Yet, Schelling also re-formalizes the will. The new form of the will is not the form 
of practical reason and the representations of moral law. The new form is 
naturalistic (human) and mystic. Unlike Kant’s formal will, the naturalistic and 
mystic forms respond to the issues of the natural and spiritual world. 
Consequently, Schelling’s concept of the will is not like Kant’s concept – empty.   
What is, according to Schelling, the form or being of the will? Schelling 
discerns between two types of will, namely the will of the ground and the will of 
love. The will of the ground is not conscious (rational), but neither fully 
unconscious (irrational). What does this mean? It is neither conscious like God, 
nor completely unconscious like nature, which moves according to blind, 
mechanical necessity (Schelling, 2011, 67). The will of the ground is of an 
intermediate nature. The will of the ground is of a human nature. It is a desire to 
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do goodness, even though it cannot yet do so completely. The will of the ground 
is neither good nor evil, but is a prophetic power that foresees goodness.  
Why does Schelling call the will of the ground a will when it is not purely 
rational? In the will of the ground there is no unity. The will of the ground is 
neither fully rational nor fully irrational. Why is something in between still a will? 
Schelling says that the will of the ground is a will “in dem kein Verstand ist, und 
darum auch nicht selbständiger und vollkommener Wille, indem der Verstand 
eigentlich der Wille in dem Willen ist.” (Schelling, 2011, 32) Schelling says that 
the will of the ground is a will in the will, which is nevertheless still a will of the 
understanding, as a yearning for understanding. The will of the ground is an 
‘ahnender Wille’ that moves towards understanding and foresees goodness 
(Schelling, 2011, 32). In foreseeing understanding and goodness, the will of the 
ground is a will.  
The will of love, on the other hand, is complete understanding and 
therefore the will that wills pure goodness. The will of love is the spirit of God. 
Unlike practical reason, the spirit of love is able to overcome evil completely, 
because it sees unity rather than the disunity of rational or binary oppositions. 
The spirit is the Word or God’s understanding, as it can be found in the Bible. 
Yet, Schelling merely offers a mystical approach to the spirit, which is the 
understanding of the ground of existence. By means of the will of love and its 
spirit, man is able, like God, to control the ground of existence. Controlling one’s 
ground of existence means freedom for Schelling. It is the feeling of being in 
one’s element. As such, Schelling has a second concept of freedom, which I 
regard to be radically modern for the beginning of the nineteenth century.   
Schelling offers two concepts of freedom and sets them apart from the 
formal concept of autonomy of Kant. The first ‘vital’ concept of freedom is man’s 
capacity for good and evil (Schelling, 2011, 25). It is the freedom of the will of the 
ground. Another vital concept of freedom is man’s capacity to control the ground 
of existence. It is the freedom of the will of love. These two types of freedom 
describe a new form or being of the will. These vital concepts of freedom ensure 
the dynamism of the will. 
Schelling sets the vital concept of freedom apart from the formal concept 
of freedom, and thus also from Kant’s concept of autonomy. Schelling says that 
the formal concept of freedom consists of “der bloßen Herrschaft des 
intelligenten Prinzips über das sinnliche und die Begierden.” (Schelling, 2011, 18) 
As I explained above, Kant’s formal concept of the will is a will that is necessarily 
rational and is necessarily independent from sensuality and desire. Accordingly, 
man can independently legislate by means of maxims of law. Schelling critiques 
the formal concept of freedom in terms of Spinoza’s pantheism. In terms of 
pantheism, the freedom of God is the capacity of causing Himself and being an 
infinite and omnipotent being. As man is in the same substance as God, his 
freedom is the freedom of being in God, while being unfree outside of God. 
Schelling argues that man is always different from God in the totality of their 
natures. Does this mean that man is never free? No, not necessarily. To 
understand this, we have to understand Schelling’s reinterpretation of pantheism. 
	   18	  
Then we can find out how our human freedom of the will of the ground and the 
will of love can go together with the freedom of God. 
 
III. Under what condition does Schelling meet the flaws of Kant’s 
formal will? 
 
Under the condition of reinterpreting pantheism and the concept of 
identity, Schelling meets the flaw of the limitation of the will by practical reason. 
Why do we have to reinterpret pantheism? Schelling puts Kant’s concept of the 
will into Spinoza’s pantheism. The will is the primal being of the infinite line of 
efficient causes. The will is the first cause. It creates and opens up a system of 
things that relate to one another as cause and effect. As a romantic thinker, 
Schelling argues that these things have a will, rather than only a capacity to 
think. Schelling puts the will into a rational system and encounters two problems. 
Firstly, reason alone cannot explain the first cause in an infinite system of 
efficient causes. Secondly, practical reason limits the will. A system of reason, 
like pantheism, does not allow freedom. The freedom of God and his 
omnipotence compromise the freedom of man. Under the condition of 
reinterpreting pantheism, Schelling is able to solve these two problems.  
Schelling says that Kant’s system of reason does not allow freedom. 
Under what condition could freedom be permitted in the system of reason, 
according to Schelling? Schelling elucidates the problem of the reality of freedom 
within Kant’s idealism through an evaluation of pantheism and its concept of 
identity. Schelling endorses the claim that pantheism is the only possible system 
of reason that can grasp unity or identity. Yet, pantheism is eventually inevitable 
fatalism because it does not permit the reality of freedom (Schelling, 2011, 11). 
Therefore, Schelling explains in the Freiheitsschrift another interpretation of 
pantheism, through which a vital concept of freedom is allowed within an all-
encompassing rational system. The vital concept of freedom purports that one 
can will both goodness and evil, which opposes itself to a formal concept of 
freedom as autonomy, that is, the independence to impose one’s own law upon 
oneself, that is, of willing goodness alone. There is also another vital concept of 
freedom, which purports that man can overcome evil and control the ground of 
his existence. In what follows, I will first explain how Schelling reinterprets 
pantheism and the place freedom attains within this system. Thereafter, I will 
explain how a vital concept of freedom makes the will dynamic. It remains my 
goal to demonstrate how Schelling’s concept of freedom adapts the form of the 
Kantian will and why it makes the will dynamic instead of lifeless.   
Pantheism proclaims the unity of God, man and other things. What is this 
unity or identity? Schelling describes three interpretations of the identity of things 
in pantheism. First of all, identity is “der Immanenz der Dinge in Gott.” (Schelling, 
2011, 11) God is everything and everything is in God. Schelling critiques that 
despite the unity of man and God, God’s omnipotence determines man 
completely and, consequently, man loses his freedom (Schelling, 2011, 12). 
God’s omnipotence is his freedom to create the world. If God would withhold his 
omnipotence, man would immediately cease to be. Therefore, we have to 
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maintain the determinism of this interpretation, and accept that man cannot be 
free. This is unacceptable for Schelling. The fact that man cannot be free within 
this form of pantheism disqualifies the interpretation for Schelling. 
Secondly, identity consists in “einer völligen Identifikation Gottes mit den 
Dingen, einer Vermischung des Geschöpfs mit dem Schöpfer.” (Schelling, 2011, 
12-13) God is everything and every thing is God. In this interpretation, Schelling 
identifies the problem of two opposing natures: God is infinite whereas man is 
finite. If we take into account the infinite difference between God and individual 
things, we have to conclude that all individual things together cannot amount to 
God, in so far as no sort of combination can transform what is by nature 
derivative into what is by nature original (Schelling, 2011, 13). Spinoza solves 
this problem by claiming that an individual thing is a modified form of God. 
However, Schelling insists that it cannot circumvent the objection that individual 
things and God are different ex toto genere suo. How does Schelling solve the 
problem that God, the first cause in an infinite system, is different from individual 
things, and simultaneously still in identity with individual things? Schelling offers 
us a radically new interpretation of identity, by means of which he solves the 
inevitable fatalism in Spinoza’s pantheism. Under this condition, Schelling 
permits freedom in a system of determinism and unity. Under this condition 
Schelling can develop a new concept of the will that meets the flaws of the 
Kantian notion of the will.  
Schelling’s reinterpretation of the law of identity starts with a study of 
logical judgments, in which subject and predicate are equated, for instance, the 
body is blue. According to Schelling, it is problematic that the identity of body and 
blueness is understood as sameness, even though body and blueness are two 
different things ex toto genere suo. Schelling argues that traditional philosophy 
has been ignorant of the nature of the copula (Schelling, 2001, 14). As such, 
Schelling’s theory of identity prefigures Heidegger’s phenomenological 
understanding of Being. Schelling, however, explains the nature of the copula, or 
the relation between subject and predicate, in a different manner than Heidegger. 
He precedes Heidegger in saying that subject and predicate are not the same in 
identity, but differs from Heidegger in saying that the relation of subject and 
predicate has to be understood as antecedens et consequens. The relation 
between subject and predicate is, for Schelling, not one of being, but one of 
becoming. The relation of becoming does not entail that the body was 
transparent and has become blue. Such a naturalistic and reflective mode of 
understanding the relation of becoming does not do justice to the metaphysical 
ground of the relation, which is unperceivable and unreflective. Schelling explains 
the relation of becoming as a relation of potency and actuality. The body is 
potentially blue, but could also have another color, as we cannot perceive and 
reflect on the nature of the body yet. Subsequently, the body attains actuality and 
shows itself as blue. Schelling returns to the Greeks, whom he believed to have 
surpassed the immaturity of the law of identity immediately through a logical 
differentiation of subject and predicate as what precedes and what follows 
(antecedens et consequens), or, as what is enfolded to what is unfolded 
(implicitum et explicitum) (Schelling, 2011, 15). 
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Schelling argues that defenders of the foregoing claims could now offer a 
third interpretation of pantheism, which does not speak at all about the fact that 
God is everything, but rather that things are nothing and have lost individuality 
(Schelling, 2011, 16). God is everything and individual things are nothing. God is 
only God, and is not identified as being the same as individual things. Schelling 
doubts whether this interpretation can be attributed to Spinoza. He says that 
Spinoza does not attribute a negative concept to individual things. Individual 
things may be modifications, but they still have a positive meaning. Schelling 
attributes a positive meaning to the individual things by looking at their 
independence. He demonstrates that not only God is free, but man too, although 
in a different way. Pantheism now envelops the idea that God and man have the 
same ground (or substance), but they ‘become’ differently. The dependence of 
man on God does not imply that man cannot be independent. 
 
“Aber Abhängigkeit hebt Selbständigkeit, hebt sogar Freiheit nich auf. Sie 
bestimmt nicht das Wesen, und sagt nur, daß das Abhängige, was es 
auch immer sein möge, nur als Folge von dem sein könne, von dem es 
abhängig ist; sie sagt nicht, was es sei, und was es nicht sei. Jedes 
organische Individuum ist als ein Gewordenes nur durch ein anderes, und 
insofern abhängig dem Werden, aber keineswegs dem Sein nach. Es ist 
nicht ungereimt, sagt Leibniz, daß der, welcher Gott ist, zugleich gezeugt 
werde, oder umgekehrt, so wenig es ein Widerspruch ist, daß der, welcher 
der Sohn eines Menschen ist, selbst Mensch sei.” (Schelling, 2011, 18-19) 
 
It is no contradiction that the son of man is also a man himself. The son is not 
only a son, but also a man because he has his own free will. The independence 
of the son derives from the concept of man’s will, which differs from the formal or 
transcendental will. Pantheism is the only possible system of reason that does 
not have to be inevitable fatalism. Schelling demonstrates in the Freiheitsschrift 
that pantheism not only allows a transcendental freedom of God, but also a 
quintessentially human and non-formal freedom. Man’s will does not move 
dependently on his father’s will, but moves independently in its own way.  
Both the freedom of God and the freedom of man are based on Becoming, 
which is the Being of being or the nature of the copula (Wesen des Seins). 
Freedom of God is ultimately still one of Being, because he is pure or absolute 
identity. He never becomes difference. The reconceptualization of identity or 
pantheism does not change the perspective on God’s freedom, which remains 
transcendental: God is omniscient. His will is complete because of his pure 
understanding, by means of which he controls his ground. Man’s freedom is 
essentially one of Becoming, because his Being is not in identity. Man does not 
have pure understanding. Therefore, man’s will is not complete. Man cannot fully 
control his ground and remains a finite being, in contrast to God, who is an 
infinite being.  
The reinterpretation of pantheism or the identity of man and God by Schelling 
makes it possible to overcome the two problems: (1) reason alone cannot explain 
the first cause in an infinite system of efficient causes; and (2) practical reason 
	   21	  
limits the will. A system of reason, like pantheism, does not allow freedom. The 
freedom of God and his omnipotence compromise the freedom of man. Through 
the reconceptualization of identity, Schelling has come to the conclusion that 
identity is, on the one hand, not sameness. God and man are not the same in 
pantheism. The identity of God and man is potential and can become actuality. 
God, as infinite being, is the first cause in an infinite system of efficient causes. 
Man, as finite being, is only an efficient cause. Reason cannot explain the first 
cause. The will, as the force that turns the potential into actuality, can explain the 
first cause. The first cause is initially potential and cannot be reflected upon by 
reason or observed by science. God is hidden in the darkness of potentiality. 
Through the actualization of the potential, the first cause comes into being. God 
says there is light and unfolds himself in the widening openness. On the other 
hand, identity is not immanence. Man’s freedom is not the freedom of being in 
God. The saying, the son of man is also a man himself, explains lucidly the 
independence of man. Man has his own free will, which does not compromise the 
free will of God. Man and God have their own will and are both becoming in their 
own way.6 
Freedom is put in a coherent system of reason – pantheism. Yet the coherent 
system of pantheism is no longer a formal system of reason. Pantheism has 
become a system in which things are not static, but dynamic. Schelling’s new 
concept of freedom fits in a new pantheistic system in which God and man are 
lively beings. We no longer speak of causes and effects, but rather about ground 
and existence. God and man are beings with an existence and a ground to that 
existence. If there is a non-ground, God’s existence is potential. If there is a 
ground, man’s existence is potential. The will of the ground and the will of love 
actualize the ground and existence of man and God. In the next section of this 
chapter I will make it more concrete how man and God become. As a result, it 
becomes clear how man’s will is dynamic. 
 
IV. How is the will dynamic?  
 
Schelling’s philosophy in the Freiheitsschrift is a mystical form of pantheism. 
The world’s substance is constantly becoming: it is of ground and then of 
existence, of antecedens et consequens, of potency and then of actuality, of 
being enfolded and then of being unfolded, of implicitum et explicitum. There is, 
however, a beginning to becoming. It all starts in a mystical non-ground, a 
darkness in which God is hiding.7 In this darkness, God has not yet revealed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  “Zuerst ist der Begriff der Immanenz völlig zu beseitigen, inwiefern etwa 
dadurch ein totes Begriffensein der Dinge in Gott ausgedrückt werden soll. Wir 
erkennen vielmehr, daß der Begriff des Werdens der einzige der Natur der Dinge 
angemessene ist.” (Schelling, 2011, 31) The death concept of things in God, the 
concept of immanence, has to be eliminated, because it does not do justice to 
the concept of becoming for each individual thing in nature.  
7 Schelling adopts his interpretation of the non-ground from the German mystic 
Jakob Böhme. Böhme claims that there is an initial state of magia in which 
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himself to himself, the world, and to us. Yet, God is there. He exists and has a 
ground for his existence. God always controls his ground, which makes him 
eternal. This also means that God’s ground and existence are in absolute 
identity. However, God’s ground and existence are hidden in the darkness of the 
non-ground. Schelling calls the absolute identity of God indifference, because his 
ground and existence are potential (Schelling, 2011, 30). Hidden in the darkness, 
God has neither an actual ground nor actual existence. The absolute identity of 
God is a totality of being before all ground and before all that exists, thus 
generally before any duality (Schelling, 2011, 78). God’s absolute identity is not 
an identity of opposites, but an identity as the indifference of opposites. 
Indifference has its own being, separate from all opposition. The indifference of 
ground and existence means that both are in a state of non-being. Both ground 
and existence are potencies. 
God controls His ground eternally, because he is completely rational. In line 
with the tradition, God is the omniscient being, which, for Schelling, translates in 
his pure understanding. By means of his pure understanding God controls his 
ground. God’s becoming, which is still the nature of Being in Schelling’s 
pantheism8, is always in unity. God wills his existence eternally because his will 
is pure understanding. By means of pure understanding he controls his ground 
eternally. The ground or the material world is controlled, and thereby Schelling 
excludes the material world from the good will, like Kant did. God’s will is in these 
terms a ‘Gesinnung’ and seems at first to be in conformity with Kant’s concept of 
the will.  
However, Schelling argues that God cannot be a logical abstraction. God 
cannot have a formal will. “Wäre uns Gott ein bloß logisches Abstraktum, so 
müßte dann auch alles aus ihm mit logischer Notwendigkeit folgen; er selbst 
ware gleichsam nur das höchste Gesetz, von dem alles ausfließt, aber ohne 
Personalität und Bewußtsein davon. Allein wir haben Gott erklärt als lebendige 
Einheit von Kräften.” (Schelling, 2011, 66) Even though Schelling conceives of 
God as a lively unity of powers, with personality and an awareness of this 
personality, he cannot deny that God did not have this personality and self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
something is created out of nothing, but what is created is still a nothing. “The 
non-ground is an eternal nothing but forms an eternal beginning as a craving 
[Sucht]. For the nothing is a craving for something. And since there is also 
nothing that may give something, the craving is itself the giving of that which is 
indeed also a nothing as merely a desiring [begehrende] craving. And that is the 
eternal primal state of magia which forms in itself since there is nothing. It forms 
something from nothing, and that just in itself and, since indeed the same craving 
is also a nothing as only a mere will, the will has nothing and is also nothing that 
may give itself something,; and it has also no place where it could find or rest 
itself.” (Schelling, 2006, 85)  
8 I call Schelling’s philosophy a pantheism. Schelling agrees to this classification 
himself: “Wer endlich darum, weil in bezug auf das Absolute schlechthin 
betrachtet alle Gegensätze verschwinden, dieses System Pantheismus nennen 
wollte, dem möchte auch dieses vergönnt sein.” (Schelling, 2011, 81) 
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consciousness in the non-ground. God remains motionless before his self-
revelation and revelation to the world. This brings me to the question: from where 
does God derive his self-awareness and lively character? According to Schelling, 
Being can only become aware of itself through Becoming (Schelling, 2011, 75). 
This means that God (world, and man) must first by a certain will power be 
actualized.  
In Schelling’s pantheism, God and man are of the same substance, but they 
become differently. To mark the difference between man and God, man must 
become in a ground that is other than God. “Die Dinge haben ihren Grund in 
dem, was in Gott selbst nicht Er Selbst ist, d.h. in dem, was Grund seiner 
Existenz ist. Wollen wir uns dieses Wesen menschlich näher bringen, so können 
wir sagen: es sei die Sehnsucht, die das ewige Eine empfindet, sich selbst zu 
gebären. Sie ist nicht das Eine selbst, aber doch mit ihm gleich ewig.” (Schelling, 
2011, 31) Man has his ground in that what is the ground of His existence, but in 
that in which God is not Himself. Man has his ground in Sehnsucht (Yearning), 
which is coeternal with God. Yearning wants to give birth to God, but in wanting 
the birth of God it is not yet able to. Yearning is in disunity. It is the will that 
foresees understanding, the understanding by means of which man could be in 
control of the ground of his existence. The difference between man and God is 
that God has his ground in himself, while man does not. God can beget the 
ground of his existence, because he is omniscient. Man does not have his 
ground in God or in himself, but in Yearning, which is coeternal with God, but in 
disunity (Schelling, 31). Therefore, man cannot beget his own ground. For that 
reason, man is a finite being. 
Yearning is in disunity, but regardless still a will. Yearning is a will that yearns 
understanding and goodness. It is an ahnender Wille. It is a will that has no 
understanding yet, and for that reason it is not an independent and complete will, 
in terms of the features Kant ascribed to the will (Schelling, 2011, 31-32). 
Schelling calls it nevertheless a will in a will. I believe that Schelling has found 
here the dynamic character of the will. The Yearning is that what moves the will. 
The Yearning shows itself as a dynamic will, in constant struggle with evil for the 
sake of goodness. It is the first stirring of divine existence, says Schelling. It is 
the primordial power that tries to unfold God that hided in the non-ground. 
However, instead of giving birth to God, it gives birth to the ground. The potential 
ground in the non-ground becomes actual ground through Yearning, also called 
the will of the ground. The will of the ground is neither a fully conscious nor a fully 
unconscious will. It moves with the urge to unfold nature, neither fully involuntary 
nor fully out of compulsion. The will of the ground gives birth to the ground, the 
ground of God’s, man’s and world’s existence. Despite the intentions, the will of 
the ground cannot guarantee fully and eternally the goodness of their existence.  
“Aber entsprechend der Sehnsucht, welche als der noch dunkle Grund die 
erste Regung göttlichen Daseins ist, erzeugt sich in Gott selbst eine innere 
reflexive Vorstellung.” (Schelling, 2011, 33) Another equally eternal beginning 
besides Yearning is the development of spirit. In God there is a primal will – the 
will of understanding – that is unlike the Yearning a complete will. It is complete, 
because it is completely understanding. By means of the primal will God 
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becomes aware of himself as eternal existence. The primal will establishes a 
reflexive image of God. The reflexive image of God “ist zugleich der Verstand – 
das Wort jener Sehnsucht, und der ewige Geist, der das Wort in sich und 
zugleich die unendliche Sehnsucht empfindet, von der Liebe bewogen, die er 
selbst ist.” (Schelling, 2011, 33) The primal will is a becoming that makes God 
aware of his being, that is, awareness of his pure and eternal existence. The 
primal will actualizes God’s existence as spirit. The spirit is the breath of love 
through which God can beget the ground of His existence. It is the Word together 
with the infinite Yearning that makes the primal will a freely creating and all-
powerful will (Schelling, 2011, 33). Schelling has thus come to a new conception 
of an idealistic and dynamic will, the Word/Understanding making it idealistic and 
the Yearning making it dynamic. 
Out of the non-ground have arisen an actual ground and actual existence. In 
God these two principles are united through the primal will. The primal will stands 
above the two principles, as God is pure love/understanding and therefore the 
absolute identity of both principles. The primal will is a free will, being free from 
the two principles (Schelling, 2011, 36-37). In man, the principles of ground and 
existence are not in unity. Man does not control the ground of his existence, 
except when the will of love overcomes the evil in nature. The will of love is 
man’s version of the primal will, even though dependent on the two principles. 
Man has to deal with the dark and evil principle of the ground and has to deal 
with the light and good principle of existence. The will of the ground wills the 
ground and the will of love wills our existence. The will of love is inherently good, 
as it purely understands nature and its will. The will of the ground is neither 
inherently a good and light principle, nor an evil and dark principle. The freedom 
of the will of the ground is different from the freedom of the will of love. The 
freedom of the will of the ground is quintessentially human. The will of the ground 
is the yearning to give birth to life, which is not immediately and necessarily evil 
in itself (Schelling, 2011, 71). Yet, it is neither necessarily good in itself, as it 
cannot exclude evil. The will of the ground yearns goodness, but goodness 
cannot go without evil. The freedom of the will of the ground is man’s freedom or 
capacity to do both good and evil (Schelling, 2011, 25).  
I interpret Schelling’s will of the ground as neither good nor evil, because I 
believe that the choice for good and evil still has to be made. Others however, 
like Michelle Kosch, would argue that the will of the ground is the dark and evil 
principle (Kosch, 2014, 155). I agree with her that Schelling posits these claims in 
the Freiheitsschrift, including the idea that the subjugation of the will of love to the 
will of the ground results in the egoism of the individual. However, it neglects the 
positive character of the will of the ground, and its independence from the will of 
love. It neglects that the will of the ground foresees understanding and goodness. 
It does not pay proper attention to the search for goodness by the will of the 
ground.   
Similar to the will of the ground, the will of love is also an independent power, 
though independent in a different way. The will of love is a freer and more 
understanding will (Schelling, 2011, 67). Kosch again neglects the independence 
of the will of love. She says, “anything existing must incorporate the principle of 
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the ground. Only an omnipotent being could fully subordinate the ground to the 
understanding.” (Kosch, 2014, 154) In this way, Kosch denies man’s power of 
love. As a result, she can only subscribe the position that man has a freedom to 
do good and evil, and not the freedom to control the ground of existence. I want 
to emphasize that Schelling also subscribes the position of man’s freedom to 
control the ground by a will of love. I want to stress Schelling’s claim that man 
has a will of love. The will of love is not a capacity of mathematical necessity, and 
has neither mere pure reason in itself, but it is a capacity with personality and 
spirit “(wie wir den vernünftigen Autor vom geistreichen wohl unterscheiden).” 
(Schelling, 2011, 67) The act of the will of love is the revelation of the spirit of 
God. 
How does Schelling distinguish the purely rational from the spirit? The spirit 
makes the will of love ultimately dynamic, because the will of love, through the 
spirit, begets the one ground of existence. Reason on the contrary cannot make 
the will dynamic, because it can only distinguish, and see the world in opposites. 
For instance, God has infinite attributes while humans have a finite amount of 
attributes. Another example, life can only be understood in terms of one’s 
eventual death. Reason cannot grasp the positive nature of life; it cannot grasp 
the eternal ideal of life. Human reason cannot grasp what we share with God – 
eternity – and in that sense cannot understand what it means to be created in his 
image. The spirit, on the contrary, is able to understand the unity of the world, 
because it observes the world from the perspective of love. Love gives birth to 
existence forever. Through love, God gives birth to Himself, and man gives birth 
to man.  
The purpose of the will of love is to raise goodness out of the darkness, and 
ultimately separate evil from goodness by putting it back into the non-ground. It is 
the goal of the will of love to make evil a mere potency and goodness pure 
actuality. After the non-ground has divided into two equally eternal beginnings, 
both ground and existence become actual. As such, darkness and light, the real 
and ideal or nature and ideal, and evil and goodness are actual for us as 
dualities. The will of love links these two dual forces that can exist for 
themselves, but cannot exist in themselves or without the other. The will of love 
has the same purpose as the primal will: controlling the ground and creating an 
identity of ground and existence. In other words, the final purpose of love is to 
take away the difference between goodness and evil. This does not mean that 
love creates a new absolute identity or state of indifference, because goodness 
will stay actual, and evil becomes non-actual. The will of love creates a ‘general 
unity’, and not actual absolute identity (Schelling, 2011, 80). God is love and thus 
absolute identity. God reveals the spirit to man, which is the breath of love. 
Through revelation human beings have the capacity to love and through love 
they have the capacity to redeem the world by creating a general unity.  
The dynamics of the will is grounded in, on the one hand, the Yearning and, 
on the other hand, the will of love that perpetuates the will. The eternity of the will 
is a result of the eternal perpetuation of both will of the ground and the will of love 
that counter and support one another. Schelling symbolizes this eternal 
phenomenon by the ouroboros, a snake that is eating its own tale: “In dem Zirkel, 
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daraus alles wird, ist es kein Widerspruch, daß das, wodurch das Eine erzeugt 
wird, selbst wieder von ihm gezeugt werde. Es ist hier kein Erstes und kein 
Letztes, weil alles sich gegenseitig voraussetzt, keins das andere und doch nicht 
ohne das andere ist.” (Schelling, 2011, 31) The will of ground and love are one 
(indifferently) in the primal will. The will of the ground ensures that no thing is 
another thing (there is always difference), and the will of love ensures that no 
thing is without another thing. The will of the ground, or Yearning, is the 
beginning of the circle by begetting the One, while the will of love, or Spirit, 
closes the circle by begetting the beginning of the circle. In that sense the primal 
will is eternal because of the two equally eternal beginnings that eternally 
perpetuate the cycle. As such there is an eternal cycle of the will of the ground 
that wills different existence and the will of love that wills one ground of those 
different existences.  
The dynamic will consists of Yearning, which is the motoric power, and of the 
will of love, which is the understanding by means of which we beget the eternity 
and purity of existence. The dynamics is grounded in the freedom of both wills. 
The freedom of Yearning, or the will of the ground, corresponds to the nature of 
the human being. Man has a capacity to do both good and evil. This constitutes 
man’s personality and a will towards goodness, in order to overcome our evil 
characteristics. The freedom of the will of love corresponds to the nature of our 
existence. We have to love our existence in order to continue existing in eternity. 
Both will of the ground and will of love are dynamic, because they are not limited 
by practical reason. Simultaneously, they are dynamic, because they respond to 
the practical needs of ground and existence.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
What is according to Schelling wrong with the formal concept of the will? 
Schelling would have said that the formal will belongs to the transcendental 
world, and not to the natural world. Therefore we cannot prove the reality of 
Kant’s idealistic concept of the will, and we cannot prove that man, who is 
according to Schelling primordially a natural being, has a moral disposition. What 
are the flaws of the transcendental concept of the will? First of all, the 
transcendental will can only will goodness and not evil. Kant’s will is limited by 
reason, and is according to Schelling not a free will. Freedom means that there is 
no such limit, and thus that one can also will evil. In the Freiheitsschrift, Schelling 
wants to demonstrate that within the boundaries of the idealism of the will there is 
still place for the reality or the feeling of freedom (Schelling, 9). Secondly, man is 
according to Schelling primordially a natural and not a transcendental being. 
According to the formal concept of the will, a natural being does not have a will, 
which belongs to the transcendental world only. This entails that outside the 
transcendental world, or outside God, our will means nothing. Does this mean 
that man, as a natural being, is necessarily or inherently evil? In the 
Freiheitschrift, Schelling wants to prove that there is no original sin. Evil remains 
always a choice. Schelling wants to prove that natural man has a free will to 
make a choice for evil or for goodness. Nevertheless, Schelling also proves that 
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man has a higher natural capacity, namely the power of love. Through loving, 
man can attain a higher form of freedom. 
In this chapter I wanted to explain under which conditions we could meet the 
flaws of Kant’s formal concept, according to Schelling’s mystic and pantheistic 
philosophy. First of all, the new interpretation by Schelling of identity or the Being 
of the copula as Becoming has helped us eliminate the dead concept of identity 
as sameness and immanence. The relationship of ground and existence or 
potentiality and actuality allows an understanding of being dependent and 
independent at the same time. Man is both dependent on and independent of 
God. Independent of God we have a free will to do good and evil, and dependent 
on the revelation of God we can freely control the ground of our existence.  
According to Schelling, the will is not limited by reason. First of all, there is the 
will of the ground. The will of the ground, or Yearning, is a will that is never 
completely conscious nor completely unconscious, and thus not limited by 
reason. The will of the ground is the motoric power that yearns for goodness, but 
is nonetheless unable to prevent the evil in our world. Yearning is that what 
makes the will primordially dynamic. Secondly, there is the will of love. The will of 
love, and the primal will, are complete understanding. This does not mean that 
they are limited, like in the original sense of Kant’s formal will. The will of love 
and the primal will are limited by the spirit, but not by reason. Reason 
understands the world in negative terms, that is, in oppositions. Spirit 
understands the world in positive terms, that is, in unity. The spirit of the will of 
love wills the one pure ground of existence, that is, existence understood in its 
eternity. The will of love makes the will also dynamic, because it can beget a new 
ground for existence, and thus a new will of the ground.  
By means of a new understanding of the nature of identity, Schelling has 
brought us to an idea of becoming that has changed the conception of the will. 
Under this condition, Schelling has given us an idea of a will that is not limited by 
reason. Schelling’s mystic pantheism is a system of unity that still allows the 
feeling of freedom. This freedom exhibits itself in the dynamism of the will of the 
ground and the will of love. The freedom to do good and evil belongs to the 
capacity of Yearning that wants goodness, but cannot prevent evil. Perhaps we 
can understand the Yearning as the feeling of the need to be more responsible: 
the feeling of the need of goodness. This feeling or gravitating power of 
responsibility is the radical freedom of our capacity to do both good and evil. On 
the contrary, there is also the feeling of actually being responsible. This is man’s 
freedom of controlling the ground of pure existence, which is the feeling of love, 
and the result of the will of love. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
28	  
3 
 
Cohen’s Concept of the Will 
 
 I. The Idealism of Neo-Kantianism 
 
In this third chapter I proceed to inquire the conditions under which we 
could philosophically meet the flaws of the Kantian formal will. In this chapter I 
will focus on Cohen’s concept of the will. Unlike Schelling’s treatise, which is 
largely focused on freedom, Cohen has a whole treatise on the will, called Ethik 
des reinen Willens, published in 1904. It is the second book of his system of 
philosophy, which consists of three books on logic, ethics, and aesthetics. Cohen 
imitates Kant’s critical system of philosophy. Yet, Cohen’s critical idealism 
diverges from that of Kant. Cohen does not validate ethical knowledge in the 
absolute ground of practical reason, but in the hypothetical ground of moral 
ideas. Moral ideas are always hypothetical and have to prove themselves to be 
practical. A moral act must demonstrate whether a moral idea was just or unjust.  
Cohen’s Ethik is not a critique of practical reason, but an ethics of the pure 
will. The biggest difference between the Neo-Kantian philosopher Cohen and the 
German Idealist Kant is Cohen’s foundation of ethics in a hypothetical ideal, 
rather than in practical reason. A pure concept of the will is not a concept of 
practical reason, but a concept independent of the faculty of thinking. Practical 
reason is directed at an object. The will, on the other hand, is directed at a moral 
act. Every concept that Cohen develops in Ethik des reinen Willens is related to 
the moral act.  
Cohen is the father of Neo-Kantianism, a stream of philosophy that he 
developed in the second half of the nineteenth century. Cohen makes a return to 
Kant. In Ethik des reinen Willens Cohen develops a Kantian ethics, which claims 
that a will is a will through the representations of law by practical reason. This 
does not entail, right away, that Cohen’s ethics is formalistic in the same way as 
Kant’s. Cohen develops his own kind of philosophy in which the will is an 
independent and dynamic capacity. Cohen makes the will dynamic through the 
concept of Willensgefühl or Affekt. A will requires not just an intellectual 
motivation, but also an affect to move.  
How does Cohen return to Kant and how does he dissociate himself from 
Kant? According to Cohen, the pure will and pure understanding are the same 
thing. This resembles the Kantian formula that the will is the same thing as 
practical reason. Cohen argues that practical reason makes the will part of 
ethics. In the sphere of ethics, we can rationally know the will, while outside of it 
we cannot know how to will goodness. Practical reason sets ethics apart from 
religion, mythology and psychology. While mythology and religion tell us what we 
have to believe in, in order to become good and free in this ‘dangerous’ natural 
world, ethics gives us knowledge of goodness and freedom (Cohen, 1904, 47). 
Ethics also distances itself from Psychology, which begins with the naturalistic 
presupposition that man is an animal. Cohen agrees that man has animal-like 
tendencies, but argues that man has also a moral disposition and becomes 
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distinctively man through the ethical concept of Sein des Sollen (Cohen, 1904, 
21). 
Cohen returns to Kant by adopting the division of Sein und Sollen (of 
Being and what we ought to). Sein is the Being of the natural world and does not 
belong to the world of ethics. Sollen or that what ought is that what instructs the 
will. The ethical will is grounded and enabled in Sollen (Cohen, 1904, 27). So far 
does Cohen align Kant. However, Cohen opposes naturalism, which brings 
ethics under the denominator of Being. Through naturalism we conceive of our 
passions and acts as mathematical lines and physical substances (Cohen, 1904, 
15). Consequently we derive what we ought to do from what naturally is. Cohen 
argues that Sollen des Seins can never be the principle of ethics. Sollen cannot 
be subjugated to Sein. On the contrary, Cohen wants to understand ethics purely 
rationally, that is, without any sensible data from nature. He therefore looks at the 
Sein des Sollens or the Being of what ought. The Being of what ought is an ideal, 
an ideal of what we ought to do. Here, Cohen combines Kant with Plato. Cohen 
returns to Plato, because he thinks that ethical knowledge derives its basis solely 
from ideas and not from sensible data. “Es ist der Weg des Idealismus, der von 
dem Gängelband der Natur und von der Tyrannei der Erfahrung sich frei macht.” 
(Cohen, 1904, 13) Kant’s critical philosophy has its ground in sensible data. 
Cohen’s ethical philosophy is critical in a different way. Cohen does not validate 
ethical knowledge in the absolute ground of practical reason, but in the 
hypothetical ground of moral ideas. “’Thought is thought of the origin’ and 
remains so in all pure knowledge. That means that borrowing from Plato’s 
concept of hypothesis, all thought is conceived of as a foundation. Knowledge 
derives the basis of its validity solely from thought and not from a ‘given’ to which 
thought would have to refer.” (Holzhey, 2005, 16) The reintroduction of Plato’s 
hypothesis sets Cohen’s Neo-Kantianism apart from Kant. 
 
II. Purifying and materializing the will 
 
Cohen’s Neo-Kantianism allows a new concept of the will. This will is not 
guided by practical reason, but by ideals. I will shortly introduce how Cohen 
purifies Kant’s concept of the will by the ideal. The reformulation of the will by the 
ideal also allows the affect to be incorporated in the concept of the will. Cohen is, 
consequently, able to materialize the will by the affect. The affect is the moving 
power of the will and ensures that the will results in an act. The ideal ensures that 
the act inspires a new will, which moves by the affect. The ideal, in other words, 
ensures that the affect becomes a Tendenz. The ideal of eternal moral labor 
motivates our will and goes together with the eternal tendency to act morally.   
Cohen is dealing with two problems in Kant’s concept of the will. Firstly, 
the will is equated to practical reason. Secondly, the will excludes any kind of 
affect that moves the will. Therefore he has to purify and materialize the will. The 
purification of the will is a result of the concept of Sein des Sollens. “Das Sein 
des Sollens ist das Sein des Wollens, das Sein des Willens” (Cohen, 168) What 
is the Sein des Sollens? Is Kant’s practical reason, as the being of the will, the 
same as Cohen’s Sein des Sollens? Cohen says that the Sein des Sollens is a 
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practical ideal, but not a practical idea. Ethical being finds its reality in the ideal 
(Cohen, 1904, 423) Holzhey stresses the historical reality of the Sein des Sollen. 
The reality of ethical being does not lie in nature, to which ideas relate, but lies 
eternally in the future, to which the ideal relates (Holzhey, 2004, 29) The ideal is 
different from the idea, because it is directed towards the future. Kant’s will is 
always connected with a Gegenstand (rational object). Cohen’s will, on the 
contrary, is always connected with a Handlung (act) (Cohen, 1904, 177). The act 
in the future always leads to a new will. The act is a sort of Kantian judgment that 
evokes a new motivation for the will. Cohen’s concept of the will is therefore 
dynamic, as it lives on through a ‘Tendenz’ or ‘Ideal’. Whether the effect of the 
will may be bad, there is still a tendency to goodness or an ideal that gives new 
impetus to the eternal work of morality. Kant’s formal concept of the will could 
never be dynamic, because the law limits it. Cohen’s concept of the will, on the 
contrary, is dynamic, because it is unlimited by the eternal task of moral labor. 
Kant’s law is made for the sake of the law and its universalism. Cohen’s moral 
law is made to be acted upon, and if bad, to be renewed. There is an ideal of an 
eternal task of labor to attain the unachievable – goodness.  
Cohen separates the will from thinking by disconnecting the will from the 
Gegenstand (rational object), and by reconnecting it to the Handlung. Cohen 
critiques Kant’s concept of ‘Gesinnung’, which he calls a ‘Bedingung’. He says 
that Kant’s will is conditioned by thinking, while it should be conditioned by the 
ideal. Through the ideal the ‘Gesinnung’ becomes a ‘Gesinnung der Ewigkeit’ 
(Cohen, 1904, 404). The disposition of the will is not the limitation by practical 
reason and the representations of moral law. The disposition of the will is the 
eternal ideal. What does eternity mean, according to Cohen? Cohen does not 
interpret eternity in terms of time, as never-ending time. Cohen explicates 
eternity in terms of the will and our moral activity: “Die Ewigkeit, von der Zeit 
Abgelöst und auf den reinen Willen bezogen, bedeutet nur die Ewigkeit des 
Fortgangs der sittlichen Arbeit.” (Cohen, 388) Eternal moral labor is our ideal, the 
goal of our will. At the same time is our eternal moral labor our will. The will is the 
being of our ideal, and the ideal is the being of our will. “Wollen ist Sein des 
Ideals.” (Cohen, 1904, 403) The ideal is, for Cohen, the pure form of the will. 
Cohen further critiques Kant’s formal will for its lifelessness. The Kantian 
good will, which is purely reason, has no moving power and is not directed at an 
act. The pure will, according to Cohen, moves because of an affect and always 
results in an act. The act tests whether our laws are good or bad and gives us a 
new ‘Willensgefühl’ and motivation for a new will. The feeling and the cognition of 
the result of a moral act, either bad or good, evokes a new affect and new idea 
for a new will. The constant evocation of an affect is understood in terms of a 
tendency for goodness. The purification of the concept of affect, as tendency, 
allows it to be incorporated into the concept of the will. The purification of the 
concepts permits the materialization of the will.  
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III. Under what condition does Cohen meet the flaws of Kant’s formal 
will? 
 
What is the philosophical ground of the purification of the will? Cohen’s 
Ethik begins with a chapter on the principle of truth. His approach to truth yields a 
whole new perspective on the will. Under the condition of reinterpreting ‘truth’, 
Cohen permits the formation of a vital concept of a pure will. Cohen argues that 
truth is not a fixed idea, but a hypothesis in search of clarity. Under this condition 
we arrive at the concept of a pure will that functions through a dynamic ideal, and 
not through a fixed rational idea. The ideal is the hypothesis. Moral goodness has 
to be tested, and can only be searched for. In the eternal task of moral labor we 
are guided by this search for truth. 
  What does truth mean? Traditionally philosophy has understood truth in 
terms of the logical formula of adaequatio rei et intellectus – the agreement of 
object and intellect. For Cohen, the source of an agreement does not lie in the 
faculty of thinking, but in the faculty of the will. The agreement must be 
understood in purely ethical terms. As a result, there is not an agreement of 
object to intellect, but an agreement of the subject’s moral act and an ideal. Truth 
is the will to truth. It is our moral act that enacts the ideal or the search for truth. 
However, truth cannot be understood solely in ethical terms. It needs logic in 
order to methodologically explain the relation between the ideal and the moral 
act. Logic therefore complements and sustains ethics. Logic explains the being of 
what we ought to do. Logic explains the Sein des Sollens. Logical explains he 
relation of Sein to Sollen. Even though ethics and logic cannot go without each 
other, ethics is still independent (Cohen, 1904, 79). Ethics still determines the 
content of the Sein des Sollens. The idea of what we ought to do does not belong 
to metaphysics or to the empirical sciences, but belongs to the practical 
understanding of ethics.  
 
“Die Idee ist das Sollen. Die Ideen bedeuten nichts Anderes als 
Vorschriften des praktischen Vernunftgebrauchs, welche im Sollen 
zusammengefasst werden. In diesem Sollen liegt der Seinswert der 
Ethik. Dieses Sollen beschreibt und bestimmt das Wollen, welches den 
Inhalt der Ethik bildet. Nichts Anderes bedeutet das Sollen als das 
gesetzmässige Wollen; das Wollen gemäss den Vorschriften, den 
Gesetzen der Ethik, welche die Ethik zur Ethik machen; welche daher 
auch das Wollen selbst bedingen und ermöglichen. Denn nur im Sollen 
besteht das Wollen. Ohne Sollen gäbe es kein Wollen, sondern nur 
Begehren. Aber durch das Sollen volzieht und erobert das Wollen ein 
wahrhaftes Sein.” (Cohen, 1904, 26) 
 
Logic is the traditional sphere that explains being [‘Sein’]. Ethics, on the 
contrary, is the traditional sphere that explains what ought [‘Sollen’]. Cohen 
argues that they are autonomous spheres, but still inseparable. For Cohen, the 
principle of truth is the connection of the theoretical with the ethical problem 
(Cohen, 1904, 83). One the one hand, the theoretical problem deals with the 
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relation of being to what ought. Cohen explains that being has a hypothetical 
relation. The idea of what we ought to do is hypothetical and has to be tested by 
the act. Cohen’s logic explains that Sollen is never in service of Sein. Ethics is 
not about what ought to be. Ethics is not concerned with physical beings. It is 
rather concerned with the being of what ought – “Die Idee ist das Sollen.” Cohen 
inverts Fichte’s ‘Sollen des Seins’ into a ‘Sein des Sollens’. On the other hand, 
the ethical problem deals with Sollen, and determines that the Sein des Sollens 
is ethical. It determines that the idea of what we ought to do is practical and 
directed towards goodness. 
What is Cohen’s understanding of logic, the traditional locus of being? 
According to Cohen, logic can explain being in terms of the possibility of 
synthetic a priori judgments (non-empirical principles), but only in the sphere of 
mathematics. This means that logic has no function in the physical sphere, which 
Kant metaphysically tried to ground by synthetic a priori judgments. The empirical 
sciences are confined to physical being, while ethics, the center of philosophy, is 
confined to moral being. In other words, ethics deals with the being of what 
ought, and not with the being of the natural world, which is the concern of the 
empirical sciences. Logic explains the relation of being to these different spheres 
of nature and morality. In respect to Ethik des reinen Willens, Logic has a 
methodological function for ethics. At this point, Cohen diverges from Kant’s 
philosophy and introduces the completely new idea of the hypothesis.  The 
ground of what ought is not an absolute (and physical) ground, but it is a 
hypothetical ground. “Die Grundlagen sind Grundlegungen. Die Tätigkeit des 
Legens eines Grundes setzt das Objekt voraus, dem der Grund zu Legen sei.” 
(Cohen, 1904, 81) Logic has a methodological function towards the being of what 
ought. Logic helps us to lay the ground of truth by means of hypothesis 
(ὑπόθεσις is Grundlegung).  
Truth is never the agreement of object to intellect. Truth is never a finished 
product of logic. Truth is never the treasure, but always the treasure seeker, says 
Cohen (Cohen, 1904, 87). Truth is always a search for truth. This is what logic 
and ethics share with one another. Logic makes our understanding pure, while 
ethics makes our will pure. The quest for purity is the reason why things appear 
to our understanding. Only in unclarity and search for clarity are things given to 
our intellect. “Sie sind nur scheinbar gegeben. Die Reinheit erst bringt sie an den 
Tag. Nur im Dämmerlichte des Problems und des Vorwurfs scheinen sie 
gegeben zu sein.” (Cohen, 1904, 89) All things come to the foreground because 
of their unclarity. In terms of ethics, it is the concept of man that appears 
unclearly and non-distinctly. The pure will, in search of truth, has to clarify the 
concept of man. It has to reveal a pure concept of man that was initially impure. 
The purity of a concept can only be willed by a will that is itself pure. The purity of 
the will lies in the reconceptualization of truth to the will to truth. In logical terms, 
the pure will is a will to truth. As such we can infer that the pure will is truth, as a 
search for truth. 
If we want to understand truth, we depend on the certainty of the existence 
of a hypothesis. It is certain that truth is something yet unclear, but willed to 
become clear. It is certain that our understanding depends on a hypothesis by 
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means of which we are able to breach unclarity or impurity. It is certain that there 
is a will to or search for truth. Truth is not what is clear, but what becomes clear 
or what is willed to be clear.   
The hypothesis that guides our will opposes the absolute idea that guides 
Kant’s formal will. Cohen’s understanding of practical reason is different from 
Kant. Cohen agrees with Kant that practical reason is always directed towards 
the ‘good’, but the idea of the good is never a fixed and a universal maxim. The 
idea of the good is always a hypothesis. What is good is unclear, but is willed to 
become clear. Under the condition of reinterpreting the understanding of truth, 
Cohen meets the flaw of Kant’s formal will, that is, the will being limited by 
reason. The hypothesis becomes an alternative to a fixed rational product, i.e. a 
maxim, which limits the will to a truth that is itself a fixed object. Cohen argues 
that the truth is never fixed, and always a search for truth.  
 
IV. What is Cohen’s concept of the will? 
 
Cohen gives in Die Ethik des reinen Willens a concept of the pure will, by 
describing a whole array of elements that make the will pure. I will describe the 
most important ones, namely the Handlung (act), the Tendenz (tendency), the 
Vorsatz (intent/motivation), the Affekt (affect), and Selbstbewusstsein (self-
consciousness).  
According to Cohen, pure understanding and pure will are the same. The 
pure will is prescriptive or prophetic. It does not say what its goal is going to be or 
what is going to result/occur, but it says how something is going to begin. The 
understanding inspires our will. It is the source of the intention to do something 
good. Cohen agrees with Kant on the prescriptive character of the 
understanding. For Kant, the goodness of the will lies in the Gesinnung 
(disposition), the categorical imperative to do good, while the result can be 
whatever it may be. Cohen argues that the understanding is not rational or 
descriptive, and does not say what its object is. For Cohen, the will differs from 
thinking as thinking always results in an object, while willing always results in an 
act. This is the reason why Cohen disagrees with Kant’s Gesinnungsethik, which 
is not concerned with the result of the will. Kant’s disposition is only focused on 
an object, while Cohen claims that the will should be connected to an act (Cohen, 
1904, 177). Kant’s will is a will towards a universal moral law, while Cohen’s will 
is a will towards a moral act. 
The method of purity or hypothesis produces our concept of the pure will. 
This method is not invented by our faculty of thinking and consequently 
implemented by our will. It is rather the character of the will itself, a will that 
anticipates purity. Instead of a disposition to do good, Cohen talks about a 
tendency to do good. Kant himself discussed in Der Streit der Fakultäten the 
question whether the human race is constantly progressing. He argues that there 
is a universal moral tendency among man towards the ideal and moral. The 
French Revolution had shown to Kant that proponents and opponents alike share 
a universal and disinterested enthusiasm for a better future (Kant, 1916, 397). 
Cohen argues in line with Kant’s ideas that there is a tendency towards 
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goodness, which is the origin of our moral will. When Cohen explains that a pure 
will requires an affect (that moves our will) and an understanding (that motivates 
our will), he comes to the conclusion that the affect and understanding are 
initially a result of our will. The origin of our will therefore lies in something 
different than affect and understanding. The origin of our will lies in the tendency 
towards goodness. The tendency is the origin of the movement of the will 
(Cohen, 1904, 127). The tendency is not just an uncontrollable passion or affect, 
but it is a pure affect. According to Cohen, the fact that this tendency anticipates 
goodness is the prime condition of all purity (Cohen, 1904, 134).  
What is the pure affect that wills our moral progress? “Es ist kein fremdes 
Element des Denkens welches diese Mehrheit an ihr hervorbringt; sondern es ist 
ihr eigener Trieb und der Begriff dieses Triebes, der diesen Fortschritt in ihr 
hervorruft.” (Cohen, 1904, 133) There is a concept, being part of the inclination 
that anticipates goodness. This concept reveals itself in the act of the will. The 
fact that a concept, a sort of intuition of goodness, is hidden in the tendency 
makes the tendency a pure affect, and the precondition of all purity (Cohen, 
1904, 134). The tendency is continuous. If it would not be continuous, we would 
call the inclination to goodness only a desire and not an affect. A desire for 
goodness fulfills itself in a one-time act. A pure affect or tendency, on the 
contrary, fulfills itself in its continuity. The act that follows the tendency always re-
awakens the tendency.  
The tendency moves us from within, but there is also a movement that 
externalizes itself in the act that follows the will. This externalized movement 
establishes both a Willensgefühl (feeling) and a Vorstellung (representation) of 
what we have willed. In other words, it establishes an affect and a motif, which 
stimulate and motivate a new will. The affect is that what moves our will. It 
comprises all our Gemütsbewegungen, that is, all manifestations of our pathos. 
The affect is an independent faculty, independent from the thinking faculty and 
independent from that what motivates the will (Cohen, 1904, 111). Cohen 
proceeds to adduce the traditional terminology to describe the character of the 
will, namely the Latin word Voluntas, which he equates to Kant’s Gesinnung. By 
Gesinnung Cohen means the sole element of thinking in the faculty of willing. 
Cohen wants to make sure that the will is not the same as thinking. He wants to 
be sure that thinking does not determine the will. It is not our thinking that 
determines the will, but our action. The goal of the moral act motivates our will. 
“Der Vorsatz geht über die Absicht hinaus, und in die Richtung der Tat über.” 
(Cohen, 1904, 117) The Vorsatz that motivates the will is not simply the same as 
the rational plan or the Absicht, because the Vorsatz is directed at the act.   
Both affect and motif constitute the will, and make sure that it results in an 
act. According to Cohen, the act makes us conscious of the will. This is 
simultaneously also a consciousness of the ‘I’ or the subject that wills. Cohen 
argues that consciousness of the subject is self-consciousness. This self-
consciousness does not belong to the sphere of thinking, but merely to the will, 
as it is not a logical self-consciousness of the self as object, but self-
consciousness of the self as subject. This subject is not opposed to an object, 
but initially opposed to the other. The other is the ‘not-I’ that is the origin of our 
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self-consciousness. Although similar to Fichte’s formula, the ‘not-I’ is always 
another subject, and never a natural or physical thing external to us. The ethical 
other is the condition for our ethical self (Cohen, 1904, 201). Our self-
consciousness is according to Cohen always a consciousness of our self as man 
that is part of the state. Our conception of the ‘I’ always symbolizes the ‘I’ of 
everyone: of me and my neighbor. Self-consciousness is consciousness of the 
pure concept of man.  
Our self-consciousness is according to Cohen grounded by the other, and is 
that what motivates a new pure will. It is not the love for the other (love for thy 
neighbor) that is the prime cause of our pure will. For Cohen, love is an affect 
that might stimulate our pure will, but never motivates our will. Only that what 
motivates our will makes our will autonomous and therefore pure. It is this 
motivation that makes ethics different from religion (Cohen, 1904, 205). For 
religion love is the most important expression or judgment. But religion does not 
transform love into a concept. Love is for Cohen an affect by means of which 
there can arise a hypothetical concept of man, that is, a man of the state that 
loves his neighbors. Religion believes that love unites one with the other. Cohen 
demonstrates that systematic ethics, guided by the pure will, is different from 
religion, because it has self-consciousness that unites one with the other instead 
of faith. 
Cohen conceives of a will that is pure by the tendency that moves it and by 
the self-consciousness that motivates it. The tendency, as the pure form of the 
affect, materializes the will. Self-consciousness, as pure understanding of the 
will, purifies the will. Yet, I am struggling with Cohen’s concept of self-
consciousness. Self-consciousness makes man, according to Cohen, 
autonomous. Does autonomy make the pure will formal? In the next section, I will 
explain how the autonomy of self-consciousness is grounded in the freedom of 
the will. As such, self-consciousness is dependent on, but not the same as the 
freedom of the will. 
 
V. What is the relation of religion to ethics, and freedom to autonomy?  
 
In “Autonomie und Freiheit”, a short essay published in the Jüdische 
Schriften, but written in 1900, four years before the publication of Ethik des 
reinen Willens, Cohen distinguishes autonomy from freedom, as autonomy is the 
principle of ethics and freedom the principle of religion. Religion and ethics have 
in common that they are about morality. Morality is their nature. Yet, ethics 
makes morality scientific, while religion does not. As a result there arises a 
distinction between autonomy and freedom, which is “der historische 
Ursprungsbegriff der Autonomie.” (Cohen, 1924, 37) Autonomy belongs to the 
newly developed sphere of ethics, a scientific sphere. Autonomy has its origin in 
the concept of freedom, as the independence of the soul from the material world. 
For Kant, it signifies the independence of our consciousness, or thinking 
capacity, from the material world. For Cohen, autonomy denominates our self-
consciousness. The autonomy of self-consciousness enables us to 
independently motivate the will. In Ethik des reinen Willens, Cohen adapts the 
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interpretation of autonomy by Kant. For Kant, autonomy or Selbstgesetzgebung 
is the imposing of a fixed rational law on oneself. Autonomy is the principle of our 
thinking capacity or our consciousness. For Cohen, autonomy or 
Selbstgesetzgebung is the act of imposing a law on oneself. The law is never a 
finished product, but always a law that is hypothetical and still has to become. 
The law has to be willed. The willing of law requires a free will. Autonomy is 
grounded in freedom.   
While autonomy develops itself out of the strains of religion into the scientific 
sphere, freedom remains a principle of religion. Freedom is the freedom of the 
soul, that is, the freedom of the will (Cohen, 1924, 39). Freedom is limited to the 
will. It is an ideal and not a physical reality. This does not entail that freedom 
does not exist. Freedom is for Cohen a Messianic idea. This means that freedom 
is an eternal task. Freedom has to be willed, and in being willed the hypothetical 
becomes an ideal truth. Freedom is the eternal task of willing. Freedom is a 
power and at the same time a task (Cohen, 1904, 298). The reality of freedom is 
not in the represented idea, but in the process of idealizing, in which we build the 
content of the love for God. “Und die Selbsidealisierung ist es, welche die 
Freiheit vollzieht.” (Cohen, 1924, 41)  
Autonomy only relates to our self-consciousness, and thus to that what 
motivates the will to create law. Autonomy is the source of the creation of law for 
oneself. Freedom relates to the will in its complete form, that is, it relates to the 
pure will that is motivated by self-consciousness and stimulated by an affect. 
Freedom is the source of the act (Cohen, 1904, 302). Freedom is the absolute 
source of all ethical behavior. Cohen hangs on to both autonomy and freedom in 
Ethik des reinen Willens. As a result, the fine line between ethics and religions 
seems to dissolve. Yet, the religious concept of freedom and of God can never 
be a presupposed in ethics. Ethics has to develop its own concept of freedom 
and God (Holzhey, 2004, 30). Cohen, thereby, maintains the differences between 
religion and ethics. For religion, God is the source of morality. Therefore, morality 
belongs to another world than that of man. Furthermore, for religion, the affect of 
love unites one with the other. On the contrary, for ethics, man is the source of 
morality. Not the affect of love, but man’s self-consciousness, in which one is 
already united with the other, motivates the will to be moral. Self-consciousness 
is the primal motif of ethics and must be the primal motif of the pure will (Cohen, 
1904. 202).  
In Ethik des reinen Willens, Cohen brings the two spheres of autonomy and 
freedom together. He speaks of two levels. There is the first level of ethics – of 
the pure will together with the act and self-consciousness. To this level belongs 
the autonomy of self-consciousness. Furthermore, there is the ground floor, or 
the foundation on which ethics is built. This is the level of freedom (Cohen, 1904, 
368). Freedom, as I said, is the freedom of the soul or the freedom of the will. For 
Cohen, freedom is a messianic ideal. What is an ideal?  Cohen explains that the 
ideal is not the same as an idea or ideatum. The idea belongs to the faculty of 
thinking. The ideal, on the contrary, belongs entirely to the faculty of the will. The 
ideal is the being of the will, and the will is the being of the ideal. In other words, 
the ideal and the pure will are the same (Cohen, 1904, 402-403).  
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The ideal is the being of what ought, or the Sein des Sollens. It is not the 
Being of a natural being, but the Being of ethical man. The ideal is the 
hypothesis. It is a request that is directed at the eternal. It is a request at the 
eternity of the will and its act. It is a request for eternal moral behavior. The ideal 
is a messianic goal, not one that we are going to realize by means of our will, but 
one that is a goal in itself. The ideal is realized in the eternal project of the will. 
The messianic goal is not an object, but it is the will itself, directed at an act 
(Cohen, 1904, 404). In that sense, Cohen’s will is part of a Gesinnungsethik. The 
ideal is the disposition of the will. This disposition distinguishes itself from the 
formal disposition of Kant, which is limited by reason and directed at an object, 
namely the law. Cohen’s disposition is informal as the will is purely will and is not 
limited by reason. The will is not directed at an object, but at an act. The act 
makes the will a pure will.  
The ideal is directed at the future. How are we going to realize the ideal in 
the future? To answer this question we need to reinterpret the meaning of the 
future. Realization of the ideal in the future does not mean that we are, for 
instance, going to realize world peace and eternal life. Eternity does not have the 
meaning of a future of unending time. Eternity has an ethical meaning for Cohen. 
It relates to the will, which may never come to an end. Eternity is for Cohen the 
unending progress of ethical work (Cohen, 1904, 388). The reality of the eternity 
of the ideal is the act. The act or the ethical work is the ideal. Cohen compares it 
to a work of art. Art cannot solely be an imagination or an impression. The 
imagination has to be worked out. It has to be transformed into a work of art. This 
work of art is not the idea of the artist anymore, but it is the ideal. Similarly, the 
work of ethics is the ideal. In the act alone the ideal attains reality. Even though 
we realize the ideal, the work of ethics remains always unfinished. The ideal 
remains an eternal task.  
To conclude this section, the autonomy of self-consciousness is grounded in 
the freedom of the will. The freedom of the will consists in the ideal. It is the ideal 
that purifies the form of the will. Together with the tendency, the ideal is the being 
of the pure and dynamic will. 
 
VI. What makes the will dynamic?  
 
First of all, the will has become dynamic through a Willensgefühl, which 
becomes the affect of a new will. The affect that Kant mentions in Der Streit der 
Fakultäten, has now made its entrance into the system of philosophy, in Cohen’s 
Ethik des reinen Willens. The affects are all manifestations of feeling that 
stimulate our will. They are the motor of our will. They are simply that what make 
the will dynamic.  
Cohen talks more philosophically about the affect, namely in terms of a pure 
affect, that is, a tendency. The tendency signifies the continuity of the affect. The 
tendency is not just a one-time stimulant, but the power that enables our eternal 
moral labor. The pure affect is also a disposition, as it is not concerned with the 
realization of an idea. The tendency of the will is only concerned with the willing 
itself. By willing man realizes the ideal of eternal moral work. The pure affect is 
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the ideal, the pure concept of the affect. The pure affect is the being of the will, 
the Sein des Sollens. It is the continuity of the tendency, or the eternity of the 
ideal of moral work that makes the will dynamic. It makes the will dynamic in 
philosophical terms, as the dynamism is not simply the power of one affect, but 
the continuous power of the will. This continuous power of the will signifies our 
freedom, or our responsibility to be moral.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Under the condition of the reinterpretation of truth, there comes into being a 
concept of the ideal that replaces the concept of a practical idea. It is not the idea 
(intellectus) that agrees with the object (res), but the ideal (the will) that agrees 
with the act of the subject. The agreement of will and act is a continuous project, 
made possible by the tendency, the pure affect of the will. The concept of 
tendency makes Cohen’s concept of the will a vital one. The will has not just 
become a will that moves through an affect, it has becomes a pure will that 
moves towards an act. This act evokes a feeling and a representation that 
stimulate and motivate a new will. In other words, there is a tendency towards 
goodness, or a continuity of the power of the will. It is this power of the will and 
the eternal task of the will that make the will free and dynamic.  
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4 
 
The Spirit of the Will 
 
 I. Beyond formality? 
 
Have Schelling and Cohen properly solved the flaws of Kant’s concept of 
the will? I believe they have. Yet, some issues have popped up along the way 
and have to be taken away in this chapter. One of these issues is Schelling’s 
concept of the will of the ground, which may not be classified as a pure will. 
Another issue is Cohen’s concept of self-consciousness and its relation to the 
ideal. To what extent can self-consciousness be part of a pure concept of the 
will? In this chapter I will reassess the visions of Schelling and Cohen in relation 
to Kant’s formal will. Consequently I will be able to draw some final conclusions 
on how we can truly overcome formalism. I will conclude that the ultimate being 
of a dynamic will is the spirit. This conclusion has consequences for the discipline 
of philosophy. I will shortly discuss these consequences and suggest some 
themes that I believe should be further inquired. 
 
II. Evaluating Schelling and Cohen 
 
I want to assess Schelling and Cohen in relation to their ideas on that 
what stimulates and motivates the will. In this thesis I have also referred to the 
distinction between matter and form of the will. The formal will of Kant lacks the 
matter to come into action. In other words, it lacks the power that stimulates the 
will. The formal will of Kant also has a form that appears obstructive to the 
dynamism of the will. The form of the formal will is practical reason. Practical 
reason motivates the formal will, but also limits it. In other words, the formal will 
of Kant needs another form that allows the motivation of the will unlimitedly. In 
Ethik des reinen Willens, Cohen has introduced the division of motor and 
motivation. The motivation of the will constitutes the content of the will and the 
motor the affect. “Die Aufgabe bildet den geistigen Inhalt; den seelischen 
Schwung gibt der Affekt” (Cohen, 1904, 190) Similar to Cohen, Schelling has 
identified two types of will. The will of the ground, or Yearning, could be seen as 
that what moves the will without understanding. The will of the ground is pure 
power, pure motor. The will of love, on the contrary, is pure understanding and 
could be seen as that what motivates the will.  
What are the merits and failures in the analysis of the will by Schelling and 
Cohen? In the preceding two chapters I have dealt with Schelling’s and Cohen’s 
solutions to Kant’s formal concept of the will, and therefore with the merits of their 
analysis. In this chapter I first want to focus on Cohen’s identification of two 
different grounds (Motor und Motiv) of the will and Schelling’s identification of two 
different wills. Why couldn’t they identify one will with one ground? The 
philosophical will to truth directs my search for a concept of the will that 
demonstrates the ultimate unity of the pure will.   
	   40	  
Why do Schelling and Cohen make the division? I believe that the division 
can be explained by Cohen’s drive to incorporate Kant’s concept of affect, and by 
Schelling’s drive to solve the theodicy. I cannot prove the influence of Kant’s 
Streit der Fakultäten on Cohen’s Ethik des reinen Willens. For me it is however 
evident that the introduction of the notion of affect in Streit der Fakultäten 
demanded a complete incorporation of this notion in a pure concept of the will. 
Schelling’s division functions to solve the problem of the theodicy. Schelling 
believes he can answer the question, ‘why does a good God permit evil?’, by 
reinterpreting freedom and the will. Schelling describes the will of love, 
corresponding to God’s primal will, which can only do goodness. He also 
describes man’s will of the ground, which cannot avoid doing evil. God’s freedom 
and omnipotence would never allow this evil. Yet, man’s freedom to do good and 
evil does not compromise God’s freedom and omnipotence. In other words, 
Cohen’s incorporation of the notion of the affect, and Schelling’s solution to the 
theodicy are the advantages of the division.  
What are the disadvantages of identifying two different wills or two 
features of the will? The problem of Schelling’s identification of two wills is the 
inability to establish the qualifications of the will. If the will of love meets the 
qualifications of the will, the will of the ground may contradict these 
characteristics and be disqualified as will. I question whether we could qualify the 
will of the ground as will. How can the will of the ground be a will if it has nothing 
to do with understanding? Schelling and Cohen have both defended the claim 
that a will without understanding is simple desire. The will of the ground is not a 
desire. Schelling claims that it foresees understanding. However, the will of the 
ground lacks the purity of the Yearning. The Yearning, which is the same 
capacity as the will of the ground, is coeternal with God (Schelling, 2011, 31). It is 
this eternity that makes the Yearning philosophically classifiable as will. The 
purity of the will is grounded in the principle of eternity. This can also be seen in 
the continuity of Cohen’s concept of tendency. As the will of the ground is not 
eternal, it does not meet the qualifications of the pure will. The same counts for 
Cohen’s concept of the affect, which is in itself impure, as it has nothing to do 
with understanding. It is the continuity of the affect however, which makes it a 
tendency, and therefore qualified to be the ground of the pure will.   
The purification is partly a solution for the impurity of the will of the ground 
and the affect. The function of the will of the ground and the affect is largely to 
demonstrate the source of dynamic power of the will. By grounding the will of the 
ground in the Yearning, and the affect in the tendency, both Schelling and Cohen 
allow a pure or philosophical concept of that what makes the will dynamic. Both 
Yearning and tendency have a lot in common with the will of love and the ideal. 
What do they all share with one another and what is the ultimate being of the 
will? What do the will of love and the ideal share? What is the relation between 
Yearning and Tendency? What do will of the ground and will of love share, or the 
affect and the motif? Nothing, but what do will of love and Yearning, or Ideal and 
Tendency share? I will answer these questions in the second section of this 
chapter, and come to the conclusion that spirit is the ultimate being of the 
dynamic will.  
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A second problem in the analysis of the will is Schelling’s concept of 
freedom to do good and evil. Freedom is only related to the will. How is this 
freedom connected to the will of the ground, if the will of the ground does not 
meet the qualifications of the will? True, the will of the ground has the capacity to 
will both good and evil. Yet, the will of the ground has no understanding. There is 
no pure understanding in the will of the ground. Neither is the will of ground self-
conscious. I will argue that consciousness of the capacity to do good and evil 
does inhibit the will of the ground and results in an absolute non-will. Only 
logically speaking could I call the will of the ground free in its capacity to do good 
and evil. Ethically speaking, the will of the ground lacks the understanding that 
makes a will free. Ethics should deal with a pure concept of the will, and for that 
reason also a pure concept of freedom. As I will show in the second section of 
this chapter, freedom is grounded in the spirit.  
A third problem is Cohen’s concept of self-consciousness. Cohen claims 
that self-consciousness is pure understanding and motivates the pure will. I 
believe that only the ideal can motivate the pure will. Self-consciousness inhibits 
the pure will. It can only formally speaking be the cause of our autonomy and the 
capacity to legislate. Non-formally speaking, self-consciousness does not 
contribute to the pure and dynamic will, but only inhibits it. 
 
III. The ultimate being of the will 
 
Both Yearning and tendency have a lot in common with the will of love and 
the ideal. What do they all share with one another and what is the ultimate being 
of the will? Let’s start with comparing the ideal to the will of love. The ideal is like 
the will of love pure understanding. This understanding is not the rational 
understanding of the world of binary oppositions or understanding in terms of 
self-consciousness, but understanding in positive terms, that is, an 
understanding of unity.  
The will of love is a free and understanding will. Its act is the revelation of 
the Spirit of God. The will of love is not a capacity of mathematical necessity, and 
has neither mere pure reason in itself, but it is a capacity with personality and 
spirit “(wie wir den vernünftigen Autor vom geistreichen wohl unterscheiden).” 
(Schelling, 2011, 67) How does Schelling distinguish the purely rational from the 
spirit? The spirit makes the will of love ultimately dynamic, because the will of 
love, through the spirit, begets the one ground of existence. Reason on the 
contrary cannot make the will dynamic, because it can only distinguish, and see 
the world in opposites. It can only distinguish ground from existence. Another 
example, reason would conceive of life in terms of one’s eventual death. Reason 
cannot grasp the positive nature of life; it cannot grasp the eternal ideal of life. 
Human reason cannot grasp what we share with God – eternity – and in that 
sense cannot understand what it means to be created in His image. The spirit, on 
the contrary, is able to understand the unity of the world, because it observes the 
world from the perspective of love. Love enables us to control the ground of 
existence. Love gives birth to existence forever. Through love, God gives birth to 
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Himself, and man gives birth to man. Love permits the unity of ground and 
existence. 
The ideal, as the being of the pure will, is the same as the will of love and 
its spirit. The ideal is the messianic spirit. Cohen’s Jewish background makes 
him conclude that the Messiah is still to come, and that His arrival is an ideal that 
will never be a reality. The meaning of messianism lies in the unity of mankind, 
that is, the ideal our moral activity is always directed at. The meaning of Israelite 
monotheism is founded on this messianism (Cohen, 1904, 214). The unity of God 
means, according to the Jewish prophets, the unity of mankind. Cohen calls it 
messianism, because the unity of mankind is an ideal that will never be realized. 
The messianic ideal remains a goal forever. Ideally the Israelite God will be 
universal, and not just a God of the Israelites. However, the image of the people 
of Israel, being separated from the rest of the world, suffering from the injustice 
that is done to them, is inseparable from the ideal to be freed from this suffering, 
their sinfulness, and detachment (Cohen, 1966, 312). Messianism is the search 
for the spirit and the unity of mankind. It is never the realization of redemption. In 
that sense, the Messiah or ideal is only a promise, prophecy, or a sign of what is 
going to happen. 
The difference between Schelling and Cohen becomes apparent in their 
religious thought. Schelling’s Christian background permits the idea of the 
fulfillment of redemption. In his philosophy we see how the will of love can 
overcome evil and establish a ground for pure existence. Through the will of love 
man is able to control this ground. “Das Ende der Offenbarung ist daher die 
Ausstossung des Bösen vom Guten, die Erklärung desselben als gänzlicher 
Unrealität.” (Schelling, 2011, 77) The end of revelation would indicate the coming 
of redemption. And we could argue that Schelling anticipates redemption when 
he talks about the end of revelation as the moment when evil becomes 
completely non-actual. Evil becomes separated from goodness and no longer 
exists as evil. Evil remains behind as a desire that wants to become actuality, but 
always remains potentiality (Schelling, 2011, 77). Ultimately, the will of love will 
enable man to attain the spirit (the Holy Ghost) completely, which before was 
only a promise, as the Yearning is merely a will that foresees the spirit. The will 
of love is the will guided by the spirit. The will of love installs our redemption. It 
separates evil from goodness forever. It enables us to control the ground of 
existence. 
Cohen’s idea of redemption in messianism is different. Firstly, redemption 
is never fulfilled. For Cohen there is the messianic ideal and its eternal task of 
moral labor. Freedom is to be willed rather than being a moment of controlling 
one’s ground of existence. Secondly, Cohen’s idea of redemption is the idea of 
unity of mankind. Schelling’s will of love does not establish this unity of mankind, 
but only establishes a unity of one’s individual existence with the ground of 
existence. As such there is a difference between the ideal and the will of love. 
The will of love and the ideal share the spirit or pure understanding with one 
another. The spirit is the being of the will of love, and the spirit is the ideal and 
the being of the pure will. The will of love and the ideal differ in terms of what the 
idea of redemption looks like. Schelling’s will of love establishes a one-time 
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redemption for the individual, and the ideal never realizes redemption of 
mankind, but keeps on idealizing the redemption. 
What is the relation between Yearning and tendency? Yearning and 
tendency are both capacities of the will towards understanding, which is not yet 
there. Yearning cannot create unity, like the will of love. Yearning rather 
exemplifies the lack of unity of ground and existence, and thus the lack of 
understanding that enables this unity. Yearning is a yearning for understanding. 
Yearning is an ‘ahnender Wille’. It is a ‘will in a will’ that foresees understanding. 
Both Yearning and tendency are eternal capacities. Schelling defies that the 
Yearning is coeternal with God (Schelling, 2011, 31). Tendency would not be 
coeternal with God, but is in ethical terms a continuous capacity. Tendency is like 
Yearning also a desire for understanding. Cohen explains that the tendency is a 
pure concept of the affect. The affect is pure because there is understanding 
hidden in the tendency. There is a concept, being part of the desire, that 
anticipates goodness, and reveals itself in the act of the will. The fact that a 
concept, a sort of intuition of goodness, is hidden in the tendency makes the 
tendency a pure affect, and the precondition of all purity (Cohen, 1904, 134).  
A desire for goodness fulfills itself in a one-time act. A pure affect or 
tendency, on the contrary, fulfills itself in its continuity. A tendency does not really 
fulfill itself, but in its continuity. Similarly, Yearning does not realize its goal of 
gaining understanding. Yearning is also an eternal process. In that sense, 
Yearning and the tendency share the Jewish messianic character of the promise 
of redemption. Yearning and tendency share the promise of understanding. In 
both cases does the spirit or understanding still have to reveal itself.  
What do will of the ground and will of love share, or the affect and the 
motif? Nothing much. They signify the distinctions that Schelling and Cohen 
made, and which I find problematic. Yet, we can conceive of affect and will of the 
ground in pure concepts, as tendency and Yearning. What do will of love and 
Yearning share? And what do Ideal and Tendency share? They all share the 
aspect of spirit or understanding. While tendency and Yearning foresee the spirit, 
the will of love and the Ideal are the manifestations of spirit. Yearning and 
tendency are both capacities in which the spirit is still potential. There is nothing 
that precedes or grounds a potential. There is only the will of love and the primal 
will that succeed the Yearning, as they actualize the power of love. The ideal, 
similarly, is an actualization of the spirit.  
 
IV. How should we understand the spirit?  
 
The spirit cannot be understood in terms of thinking and self-
consciousness. Above, I have already described how Schelling takes distance 
from the negative philosophy of reason, and how the will of love and its spirit 
belong to a positive philosophy that is able to think in terms of unity. In Ethik des 
reinen Willens, Cohen takes self-consciousness out of the logical sphere of 
rational thought and connects it to the will. Still, Cohen’s concept of self-
consciousness is different from the (messianic) spirit. Cohen describes self-
consciousness as consciousness of the self, as having a pure concept of the self. 
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According to Cohen, self-consciousness arises when the will results in an act. In 
the act we become conscious, not of the self as logical object that thinks, but of 
the self as an ethical subject that wills. The origin of our self-consciousness is not 
the (Fichtean) objective non-I, but the subjective non-I, that is, the other, or our 
neighbor, who puts a check on us. The other makes us aware of what we may do 
and may not do. Our self-awareness is consequently an awareness of the 
subject that is part of the state, the subject that acts morally in relation to the 
other.  
Cohen tells us that self-consciousness makes us autonomous. Through a 
pure concept of the self, man is able to legislate. Even though I do not disagree 
with this theory, I do want to note that self-consciousness does not make us free. 
Freedom is the essence of the spirit, as Schelling has demonstrated in the 
concept of the will of love and Cohen in the concept of the ideal. Both Schelling 
and Cohen tell us that freedom has nothing to do with self-consciousness. First 
of all, Cohen disconnects freedom from self-consciousness, and connects it to 
the will and the messianic ideal. Freedom of the will is the freedom of eternal 
moral labor. Self-consciousness is instead connected to the concept of 
autonomy. Second of all, Schelling shows that we cannot connect self-
consciousness to freedom. For Schelling there is the freedom of controlling the 
ground of existence, and the capacity for good and evil. The first concept of 
freedom could have nothing to do with self-consciousness, because the 
controlling of the ground of existence is a result of the will of love and its spirit.9 
Self-consciousness, in the German Idealist terms, belongs to the sphere of 
thinking and not to the will. The second concept of freedom has neither anything 
to do with self-consciousness. In chapter two I connected the freedom to do good 
and evil to the will of the ground, which has the freedom to will good and evil. 
Yet, the will of the ground is not self-conscious of this capacity. If man would be 
conscious of his capacity to do good and evil, he would not have a will of the 
ground anymore.  
If I would become aware of my capacity to do good and evil, my will of the 
ground would immediately cease to be free. Self-consciousness is an obstruction 
to the will. Logical self-consciousness makes us unfamiliar with the external 
word. Think for instance of making a next step down the stairs. What happens is 
that one will feel uncomfortable with making a next step. Heidegger has 
explained this phenomenon in Sein und Zeit. He explained that we do not need 
thought and self-consciousness, because we are already familiar with taking the 
next step. The staircase is zuhanden (ready-at-hand), and we don’t have to 
consider the nature of the steps of the staircase. On the other hand, ethical self-
consciousness makes us unfamiliar with our existence and the existence of 
others. In this chapter, I want to explain what it means to be unfamiliar and 
familiar with our existence and the existence of others. I want to show that self-
consciousness makes us unfamiliar, while the spirit makes us familiar with our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Hegel’s rational concept of spirit allows the connection of spirit with self-
consciousness and freedom. Schelling’s mystical concept of spirit, on the 
contrary, does not allow this connection. 
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existence and the existence of others. Our ethical self-consciousness does not 
motivate our pure will to act good towards the other; it rather inhibits the pure will, 
because one becomes uncertain. Isn’t it frightening to have a tendency to do 
good, but simultaneously also a capacity to do evil? I believe that a state of 
ethical self-consciousness turns our radical freedom or moral openness into a 
moral emptiness. It turns our will into a not-will.  
What does it mean it mean to will the ground of our existence and to will 
the eternal task of moral labor? In other words, what does it mean to have a will 
of love and to have an ideal? It means that we have faith in our own existence 
and have faith in the existence of others. While Heidegger and Levinas explain in 
logical terms the already familiarity with the surrounding world and the Other, I 
explain the already faithful relationship with my self and others. This faithful 
relationship shows how we are different from any other being. Some 
philosophers (Schopenhauer and Rosenzweig) have argued that our capacity to 
commit suicide makes us different from any other being.10 In that sense we could 
also argue that our radical freedom to do evil (and also good) makes us different 
from any other being. I believe that the spirit of the will makes us human and 
different from any other being, because it is the capacity by which we choose to 
will goodness rather than evil. Schelling’s will of love and Cohen’s ideal exemplify 
the spirit of the will. Schelling’s will of love shows how we have faith in our self. 
To have a will of love means that one has faith in one’s ground of existence. 
Cohen’s pure will shows how we have faith in the other. To have an ideal means 
that one has faith in the establishment of an agreement, one has faith in the 
establishment of ethical truth, between people. The ideal is the faith in moral 
unity of mankind.	  
I interpret the word spirit in terms of subjective and intersubjective 
confidence. Confidence, or human faith, is the ground of our ethical behavior. 
The confidence in the ground of our existence is the foundation of ethical 
behavior. Christians would say that the biggest commandment is the love for 
God, and the second commandment, equal to the first, the love for your neighbor 
like you love yourself. Here they take for granted that we all love our self. The 
precondition for the love for the other and the love for God, is self-love. Man first 
needs the will of love to have faith in the ground of his existence. Then he is able 
to idealize and have faith in the other. Yet, the ultimate ground of the spirit of the 
pure will is the love of my parents or custodians, who are the first to have faith in 
me and the ground of my existence. The faith in oneself is grounded in the faith 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10 	  “Der Selbstmord ist nicht der natürliche Tod, sondern der widernatürliche 
schlechtweg. Die grauenhafte Fähigkeit zum Selbstmord unterscheidet den 
Menschen von allen Wesen, die wir kennen und die wir nicht kennen” 
(Rosenzweig, 1976, 4) Schopenhauer, likewise, claims that suicide is the highest 
step a human being can make. However, the act of committing suicide is a 
confirmation of the will-to-live, which rather should be denied. The freedom to 
destroy oneself in order to free oneself from suffering is an illusion. From that 
standpoint, Rosenzweig argues that man’s freedom lies in the affirmation of life, 
and to rise up out of the suffering. I support that argument. 	  
	   46	  
of the other in you. The faith of your parents puts a check (Anstoß) on you. This 
check does not inhibit the desires and powers of a child, but actualizes the child’s 
will of love, that is, the faith in one’s self. 	  
 
V. Everyday examples of the spirit of the will 
 
The spirit of the will is not something that we simply experience and take 
heed of. It rather guides our will unnoticed, or is to be experienced as the power 
that defeated its opposite – the non-will. I have considered the spirit of the will as 
the power that has taken me out of my anxieties, nervousness and other 
moments of chaos in which there is absolutely no will. “Aber die Philosophie 
leugnet diese Ängste der Erde. Sie reißt über das Grab, das sich dem Fuß vor 
jedem Schritt auftut. Sie läßt den Leib dem Abgrund Verfallen sein, aber die freie 
Seele flatter darüber hinweg.” (Rosenzweig, 1976, 3) The free spirit floats off in 
the wind, above the ground where anxiety and chaos rules. We experience the 
spirit of the will when we observe from the heights of the sky the anxiety and 
chaos that is below and behind us.  
As I explained above, the ultimate foundation of the will is the spirit. The 
will is grounded in man’s confidence in the ground of existence. This confidence 
may not be noticed when it is there. The lack of confidence, on the contrary, will 
be noticed, because the disunity of the soul, or the disunity of ground and 
existence, will result in the trembling of the body. The lack of confidence entails 
the stagnation of the will. In fear and loathing there is lack of confidence. 
Therefore, I have experienced moments of fear and chaos as moments of the 
non-will. There may still be a Yearning or a tendency that urges us to do 
something, but our lack of spirit makes the will completely motionless. The 
energy of the Yearning and the tendency will clash with the lack of spiritual 
motivation. In heavy trembling, my body and mind, ground and existence, split in 
two.  
I have also experienced that modern life is full of pressure from the need 
to be active. Moments of emptiness, such as boredom express themselves 
different in modern times. We can try to relax, but still feel a need to do 
something useful, whatever that illusion may be. In modern times, passivity can 
be felt as a hardship. The emancipated individual needs to do something to 
overcome the neuroticism of the passive individual. Reason can absolutely be of 
no help. Neither can modern entertainment and technology be of enduring help. 
Only the pure will of love is able to get us out of this nothingness. The pure will of 
love constantly regenerates and helps us to be active, constantly in a renewed 
way.  
Passivity shows that the will needs constant regeneration. Only the will of 
love and the pure will can guarantee this regeneration. The will of love 
perpetuates the will by willing the one ground. The pure will is continuous 
because of the ideal and the tendency. An example of the dynamism of the will of 
love is its capacity to overcome the emptiness of fear, in which there is no 
confidence in one’s self. The will of love, although grounded in the love of others, 
overcomes the lack of confidence. The will of love has faith in the ground of 
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existence. Another example is the pure will, which has the capacity to overcome 
the emptiness of chaos. The pure will searches for truth and in willing the eternal 
task of moral labor it reveals constantly anew an agreement between people.  
The spirit of the will of love and the pure will establishes the unity of the 
individual with the self and the other. The will of love establishes the unity of the 
individual with the self. The will of love establishes the freedom of being in your 
element. The pure will, on the other hand, establishes the unity with the other. It 
establishes the freedom of feeling at home in an environment with other people. 
The spirit is the embodiment of unity, willed by the will of love and the pure will.  
 
VI. Consequences for philosophy 
 
Modern philosophy had to leave traditional idealistic philosophy behind, 
because its idea of truth and being was too static and tyrannical. Schelling and 
Cohen, however, have demonstrated possibilities for a totally vital idealism. 
Schelling’s idea that being or identity is grounded in the becoming of potential 
into actuality, or ground into existence, has disqualified the static idea of being as 
immanence and sameness of object to intellect. Schelling has furthermore 
brought idealism into the sphere of the will. The will has the power to turn the 
potential into actuality. Cohen, on the other hand, has shown that truth cannot be 
grounded in the sphere of logics alone, in which truth is thought to be the 
correspondence of intellect to object. Truth is brought into the sphere of ethics, in 
which truth is to be willed, rather than to be thought. The monopoly of thinking 
over truth has been overcome by the ethical idea that truth is the ideal of the 
eternal search for truth. Logic has only a methodological function in this search; 
truth becomes hypothetical and its object becomes man and his moral activity.  
Idealistic philosophy that starts from these principles will interpret the role 
of man in this world differently. Let me discuss a few themes for future research. 
Schelling’s new concept of the identity of pantheism could lead to the 
reinterpretation of creation. In love for the ground of existence, man creates his 
own soul, that is, the unity of ground and existence. Idealistically speaking, man 
does not create the world and physical things, but he creates another kind of 
substance, namely the soul. The human capacity of the will of love is able to will 
one ground of existence. The faith in the ground of existence means the unity of 
existence and ground. The soul, the substance man creates, is the unity of 
ground and existence. The feeling of being in one’s element – in one’s substance 
– is the feeling of the soul after creation.  
Furthermore, Cohen’s concept of truth may lead to a human concept of 
revelation. In accordance with Cohen’s concept of truth, man does not reveal 
absolute truth, but he reveals the ideal. Man reveals his search for truth in his 
eternal moral labor. Ethical truth is not a result of rational or scientific thinking, 
but a result of the pure will. Willing truth is revelation. We do not reveal an 
absolute concept of what something is, but we reveal an ideal: the search for an 
agreement. In this search we start with a hypothesis and end with confidence in 
this hypothesis. In the phenomenon of the will to truth something potential 
becomes actual. A potential ideal (hypothesis) becomes an actual ideal. 
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Something unclear (hypothesis) becomes clear. A hypothesis becomes an ideal, 
that is, belief in the hypothesis. The phenomenon of the becoming of an ideal is 
the phenomenon of revelation. Man reveals the spirit, that is, the belief in a 
hypothetical ground for truth. 
Moreover, the concept of freedom by Schelling and Cohen allow a new 
concept of redemption, also in human terms. According to their concept of 
freedom, man does not redeem the world of its sins and physical hardships. Man 
does not install redemption in terms of world peace. But he redeems himself in 
creation and redeems the other in revelation. Redemption is the freedom of the 
spirit. It is the freedom of the will of love and the pure will. On the one hand, the 
will of love establishes the freedom of man that has faith in the ground of his 
existence. This freedom entails the moment of being in one’s element. Freedom 
is here also the moment of being free of the need to be free. On the other hand, 
the pure will wills its freedom eternally. The pure will establishes the freedom of 
man that believes in an ideal, an ideal of willing the eternal task of moral labor. 
Here it is not the individual, but mankind that is redeemed in the eternal ideal. In 
relation to mankind, freedom becomes a necessity. 
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